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CHAPTER 1 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivations and Main Research Questions 
Researchers in strategic management and corporate governance have paid increasingly more 
attention to the important role of senior executives in organization outcomes (e.g., Carpenter, 
Geletkanycz, & Sanders, 2004; Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; Wales, Patel, & Lumpkin, 
2013). According to upper echelons theory, an organization is a reflection of its executive 
characteristics (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Senior executives inject their traits and opinions, 
such as demographic attributes (e.g., tenure, functional backgrounds, education, and so on) 
(e.g., Papadakis & Barwise, 2002), experiences (e.g., Tihanyi, Ellstrand, Daily, & Dalton, 
2000), and personality (e.g., Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007), into their leadership. These 
individual characteristics guide executives’ perceptions, decisions, and actions in company 
management. Among all these executive characteristics, executives’ personalities, especially 
that of the chief executive officer (CEO), can be expected to play a prominent role. Hambrick 
and Mason (1984) also pointed out that a CEO’s personality traits play a more important role 
in explaining his or her behavior than do simple demographics. Because of CEOs’ unique 
organizational roles, their personality characteristics are reflected in their personal 
preferences and behaviors, in their relationships with other group members, and in the 
structure, strategies, and performance of the firms they lead (Blair, Hoffman, & Helland, 
2008; Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007, 2011; Zhu & Chen, 2014a, b). In order to open the black 
box of upper echelons theory research, which focuses on demographics but ignores the 
psychological attributes that affect CEOs’ behaviors, it is thus necessary to expand on this 
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work in the domain of executive personality. Defined as the degree to which an individual 
has an inflated self-concept and strives to have this self-concept continuously reinforced 
(Judge, LePine, & Rich, 2006; Campbell & Miller, 2011), narcissism appears to be a very 
important personality trait in understanding executive leadership in company management 
(Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; Engelen, Neumann, & Schmidt, 2013; Zhu & Chen, 2014a). 
Existing research has pointed out that a high level of narcissism is a fundamental personality 
trait of CEOs (Judge et al., 2006). Narcissism has also been described as a trait that could 
cover CEO personality comprehensively and could also overlap with other important 
personality traits (Engelen et al., 2013). Furthermore, in an organizational context, Chatterjee 
and Hambrick (2007, 2011) showed that highly narcissistic CEOs’ strategic decisions differ 
systematically from their less narcissistic counterparts (Engelen et al., 2013). Thus, the 
exploration of a CEO’s narcissism makes possible a profound analysis of the influences of a 
CEO’s personality in company management.  
The last several years have witnessed a surge of interest in how narcissistic CEOs 
affect the organizations they lead (e.g., Engelen et al., 2013; Rosenthal & Pittinsky, 2006). 
Research has suggested that highly narcissistic CEOs, typically characterized by dominance, 
self-importance, a sense of entitlement, arrogance, and low empathy, tend to manage firms 
very differently from CEOs with a relatively low narcissistic tendency (Zhu & Chen, 2014a, 
b). How narcissistic CEOs act differently in company management could first be reflected in 
their strategic decisions. For example, narcissistic CEOs have shown to be positively 
associated with dynamism and grandiosity of company strategies, as well as the number and 
size of acquisitions that the firm made (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007, 2011). Narcissistic 
CEOs tend to be relatively aggressive in their adoption of technological discontinuities 
(Gerstner, König, Enders, & Hambrick, 2013). Thus, highly narcissistic CEOs tend to favor 
bold and risky actions driven by their strong desire for attention and admiration (e.g., 
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Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007, 2011; Engelen et al., 2013; Zhu & Chen, 2014a, b). In 
contrast, a less narcissistic CEO might be inclined to emphasize stability (Zhu & Chen, 
2014a, b) and dwell on the inherent riskiness of a new technology and strategy (Chandy & 
Tellis, 1998; Gilbert, 2005). Moreover, how narcissistic CEOs lead companies differently 
could also be reflected in how they deal with the relationship with other organization 
members. Narcissistic leaders have been shown to be more likely to devalue others, react 
aggressively to criticism (Paulhus & Williams, 2002), inhibit equitable exchanges with staff 
(Nevicka, De Hoogh, Van Vianen, Beersma, & McIlwain, 2011), and thus to have unhappy 
employees (Blair, Hoffman, & Helland, 2008). Existing research has also pointed out that 
narcissistic CEOs are less likely to seek or consider advice from boards and they try to reduce 
the board’s influences on company strategy (Zhu & Chen, 2014a, b). Therefore, being 
boastful and self-centered, narcissistic CEOs may lack the ability to establish long-term 
effective relationships with other organization members. Previous studies have strived to 
understand how narcissism influences CEOs’ decisions and behaviors. Through these studies, 
questions about the effectiveness of narcissistic CEOs were also examined. Narcissism is 
usually considered an undesirable CEO trait when it comes to firm performance; however, 
existing research has not resulted in consistent findings about this issue (see review from 
Reina, Zhang, & Peterson, 2014). Therefore, some researchers have been trying to assess the 
critical moderators or mediators, such as organizational identification (Peterson, Galvin, & 
Lange, 2012), leadership (Peterson et al, 2012; Resick et al., 2009), audience engagement 
(Gerstner et al., 2013), entrepreneurial orientation (Wales, Patel, & Lumpkin, 2013), and 
CEO power (Zhu & Chen, 2014a), which could influence a narcissistic CEO’s decision 
making and firm effectiveness. As Campbell, Hoffman, Campbell, and Marchisio (2011) 
stated, key moderators need to be assessed to understand the true effects of CEO narcissism.  
Combining upper echelons theory with other theory lenses, this dissertation consists 
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of three independent but interlinked studies that add further understanding of the important 
role of executive traits in company management. The first focus of this dissertation is to 
further explore the role of narcissism in influencing a CEO’s decisions and behaviors in 
corporate governance. The second focus is to figure out whether and how individual and 
organizational factors influence a CEO’s narcissistic tendency or his/her decision making 
process. At the same time, this dissertation also tries to investigate the relationship between 
CEO narcissism and firm performance. The three targets are integrated into Chapters 2-4. The 
study in Chapter 2, for example, first establishes the link between CEO narcissism and a 
CEO’s social status. Social status is an individual’s characteristic indicating that individual’s 
social affiliations or their social ranking (Finkelstein, 1992; Westphal & Khanna, 2003). The 
results from a cross-lagged regression model show that CEO narcissism positively impacts a 
CEO’s social status, which indicates that a highly narcissistic CEO tends to engage in 
publicly visible activities to continuously reinforce their positive self-concept. Furthermore, 
as shown in many studies, individuals’ personality traits will continue to develop due to their 
experiences from careers, family, and social roles throughout their adult life (Lüdtke, Roberts, 
Trautwein, & Nagy, 2011; Roberts et al., 2006). Thus, to enrich the understanding of the 
influence of social activities on personality changes, Chapter 2 also examines the reciprocal 
impact of a CEO’s social status on CEO narcissism. The findings about the positive effect of 
a CEO’s social status on CEO narcissism affirm the functions of social roles in shaping how 
personality changes. In addition to exploring the casual relationships between a CEO’s social 
status and CEO narcissism, we also try to disentangle the causal relationships between CEO 
characteristics (CEO narcissism and a CEO’s social status) and firm performance. The 
empirical results from Chapter 2 indicate a reciprocal influence between a CEO’s social 
status and CEO narcissism, which not only adds to existing evidence on the important role of 
narcissism in a CEO’s behavior, but also verifies that CEO narcissism could also be 
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influenced by their social roles. As previously mentioned, how narcissistic CEOs deal with 
their relationships with other organization members also reflects how they manage firms. 
Thus, Chapter 3 shifts attention to CEO-board relationships. Previous studies have pointed 
out there is usually a conflict between CEOs and boards of directors because of the board’s 
advice, counsel, and monitoring functions (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Westphal, 1999). To 
further understand CEO-board relationships, Chapter 3 combines agency, power 
institutionalization, and power circulation theories, first exploring the predictive role of board 
power on hiring narcissistic CEOs and then uncovering the effect of CEO narcissism on 
board power following a CEO’s appointment. Our results suggest that board power is 
negatively associated with the selection of a narcissistic CEO, and CEO narcissism, in turn, 
has a negative influence on board power. These findings suggest that a board’s power plays 
an important role in deciding whether a company will have a narcissistic CEO, and will also 
provide further evidence for the opinion that highly narcissistic CEOs usually cannot 
establish long-term effective relationships with other organization members due to their lack 
of empathy and heightened level of arrogance and entitlement (Lubit, 2002; Resick et al., 
2009). Chapter 3 further affirms that CEO narcissism is positively associated with strategic 
change, and also testifies to the moderated mediation effect of CEO narcissism on firm 
performance. Thus, Chapter 3 not only adds insights into how narcissistic CEOs act 
differently by exploring the CEO-board relationship, but also complements existing research 
that focuses on the effectiveness of CEO narcissism in corporate governance. To further 
understand the roles of CEO narcissism in company management, Chapter 4 explores the role 
of narcissism in CEOs’ decision making by designing an online experiment on Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Chapter 4 focuses on the effects of CEO narcissism on risk taking 
and director selection, and also investigates whether firm financial performance moderates 
these relationships. The empirical results provide evidence for the positive relationship 
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between narcissism and risk taking and also show that narcissistic CEOs’ decisions and 
behaviors could not be significantly influenced by a firm’s financial performance. All in all, 
the dissertation enriches our understanding of the importance of narcissism in explaining a 
CEO’s organizational behaviors, complements the research on the relationship between CEO 
narcissism and firm performance, and also adds insight into whether and how CEOs’ 
narcissistic tendency or decisions could be influenced by individual (a CEO’s social status 
and board power) and organizational characteristics (firm performance). 
1.2 Empirical Approach 
1.2.1 Data Resources 
Different databases usually have different data types, data structure, and data availability, and 
there is no one database that can provide a universal coverage of all available data. Thus, it is 
necessary to combine various data sources to construct a comprehensive dataset. In individual 
executive traits and corporate governance research, there are two data and information 
sources are commonly used: public (e.g., Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007) and private (e.g., 
Wales, Patel, & Lumpkin, 2013). The widely used public databases include Compustat 
ExecuComp and RiskMetrics/IRRC. ExecuComp provides compensation data for U.S. 
directors and executives for companies within the S&P 1500. RiskMetrics/IRRC provides 
non-financial data on individual board directors (e.g., name, age, board affiliation, shares 
owned, etc.) for companies within the S&P 1500, and also provides data on whether 
companies had undertaken certain governance tactics in a specific year. Private data usually 
can be obtained through executive questionnaires and interviews (e.g., Peterson, Galvin, & 
Lange, 2012) or through experiments conducted among students (e.g., Judge, LePine, & 
Rich, 2006). Due to the difficulty in achieving direct access to top executives within large 
companies, and those executives’ reluctance to answer questions about their psychological 
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traits (Carpenter, Geletkanycz, & Sanders, 2004), most of the research on individual 
executive traits tends to use public data. This study incorporates both public data from 
different sources and private data from an online experiment to construct a powerful dataset.  
Both Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 draw upon the U.S. companies listed on the S&P 
Composite 1500. To disentangle the causal relationships among CEO social status, CEO 
narcissism, and firm performance, Chapter 2 collects data from various sources, including 
Compustat ExecuComp, Marquis’ Who’s Who, Factiva, proxy statements, company annual 
reports, etc. The design of the multiple measurement points of multiple factors makes it less 
possible to gather data from only one database. For example, Compustat ExecuComp makes 
it possible to observe executives and companies’ financial changes over time. Factiva 
includes company press releases for different years, offering the opportunity to observe 
changes in the number of executives’ names on press releases over time. As we discovered, 
none of these sources can offer full coverage of all available data. It is thus necessary to 
combine different reliable data sources to observe individual executives’ trait changes. 
Similarly, Chapter 3 also combines various data sources, including Compustat, RiskMetrics, 
Factiva, proxy statements, annual reports, etc. Chapter 3 applies a lagged structure design 
over a period of five years to explore the interrelations between board power and CEO 
narcissism, and their effects on a firm’s strategic changes. To meet the design of different 
measurement points for different factors, different data sources are also needed. These 
combined public data sources make our research objectives fulfilled and also make the results 
more generalizable, as executives’ characteristics and firms’ financials are objectively 
evaluated rather than self-rated, because it is not easy to contact leaders within large 
companies and it is even harder to trace a leader’s trait changes over time. Therefore, 
management research, especially those focusing on top managers, should pay more attention 
to public data. 
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As mentioned, another important data source in executive trait research is private 
data. One approach to obtain the data is to run experiments with CEOs through 
questionnaires or interviews (e.g., Peterson et al., 2012; Wales et al., 2013). This approach 
usually has a low response rate, especially when asking sensitive questions (Wales et al., 
2013). Thus, some research has been conducted in laboratory settings or online (e.g., Judge et 
al., 2006). Existing research has pointed out that the online experiment on MTurk provides 
high quality data with high alphas and test-retest reliabilities (Buhrmester, Kwang, & 
Gosling, 2011; Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2011). For analysis of the effects of CEO 
narcissism on risk taking and the power of new directors, Chapter 4 conducts an online 
experiment on MTurk. The online experiment obtains high quality data to testify to the 
relationship between narcissism and risk taking as proposed in the study. Consequently, to 
have a comprehensive understanding of the important role of executive personality in 
corporate governance, an experiment setting is also necessary.  
1.2.2 Analytical Approach 
Not only do we try to combine different data resources to build a comprehensive and 
powerful dataset, but we also try to use appropriate statistical approaches to test our 
hypotheses. Recent studies on individual executive traits and corporate governance tend to 
employ a longitudinal design (e.g., Zhu & Chen, 2014a, b), which enables us to detect 
developments or changes in executive traits and organizational characteristics, and can also 
add to our understanding of the causal relationships between executive traits and the key 
constituents of the firm. Since a longitudinal design involves repeated observations of the 
same subjects over a period of time, it increases the accuracy of change observations, and 
thus offers us a good opportunity to disentangle the causality in the applied setting (Taris & 
Kompier, 2003). Therefore, besides the online experiment conducted in Chapter 4, both 
Chapters 2 and 3 apply a longitudinal design. Chapter 2, for example, employs a longitudinal 
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design with two measurement points for social status, narcissism, and firm performance to 
track their changes and disentangle their causal relationships. With a five-year period of 
longitudinal design, Chapter 3 explores the interrelationship between board power and CEO 
narcissism, and their association with organizational outcomes. 
Based on the longitudinal research design, Chapter 2 utilizes multiple common factor 
crossed-lagged regression models within the framework of a structure equation model (SEM), 
and the difference-in-differences (DID) model to test the hypothesized relationships. The 
cross-lagged, structural equation modeling technique takes into account error correction, 
factorial invariance, and correlated disturbances, and is widely used to examine causal 
associations in data derived from longitudinal research designs (McDonald, 1985; McArdle, 
2009). The cross-lagged model used in Chapter 2 not only provides evidence on the direction 
of causality between CEO social status and CEO narcissism, but also estimates the strength 
of the effects of each variable on the other. As a complementary analysis, the DID model is 
also used in Chapter 2 to analyze casual relations. The DID approach is one of the most 
widely used study designs in finding the changes in policy variables (Hausman & 
Kuersteiner, 2008; Lee & Kang, 2006). It is used to examine treatment effects by comparing 
the pre- and post-treatment differences in the outcome of a treatment and a control group (Lee 
& Kang, 2006). The basic set up of the DID model is elaborated in Chapter 2. Both the 
cross-lagged and DID approaches can capture the true developments or changes in the 
characteristics of the target objects at both the individual and the organizational level. The 
results from the cross-lagged model and DID in Chapter 3 are consistent, and they all indicate 
a reciprocal influence between a CEO’s social status and CEO narcissism. Different from 
Chapter 2, both Chapters 3 and 4 apply multiple regression models. Multiple regression 
analysis is a basic statistical technique for examining the relationship between one outcome 
variable/dependent variables and one or more independent variables/predictors (e.g., Cohen 
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& Cohen, 1983), and it is widely used in psychology and management research. Building on 
multiple regression models, Chapter 3 explores the important role of narcissism in the 
dynamic relationship between CEOs and boards of directors. Chapter 4 investigates 
narcissistic CEOs’ decision making processes, particularly regarding their decisions on 
company strategy and director selection. The combination of crossed-lagged regression, DID 
and multiple regression models in the dissertation provide a rigorous analysis of the role of 
executive personality in corporate governance. 
1.3 Overview of the Chapters 
With different data sources and multiple analytical approaches, this dissertation provides a 
variety of perspectives to enrich the understanding of how CEO narcissism influences and is 
influenced by individual and organizational characteristics in company management. Based 
on upper echelons theory and personality theories, Chapter 2 combines multiple data sources 
from public databases and employs a longitudinal design with SEM and DID approaches to 
explore the casual relations between a CEO’s social status, CEO narcissism, and firm 
performance. Drawing on agency, power institutionalization, and power circulation theories, 
Chapter 3 also gathers data from public databases and applies a longitudinal design, but shifts 
focus to the CEO-board relationship. Chapter 4 provides methodological variations by 
conducting an online experiment to investigate narcissistic CEOs’ risk-taking decisions and 
the power of new directors. Chapters 2-4 are separate studies that were conducted in 
collaboration with Torsten Biemann. Chapter 5 then provides an overall summary of all the 
research results and elaborates on the theoretical and practical implications, limitations, and 
future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
2 CEO’s Social Status, Narcissism, and Firm Performance: A 
Cross-lagged Analysis of Causal Relations 
2.1 Introduction 
Narcissism is characterized by an exaggerated self-concept, self-admiration, and inflated 
self-view (Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001; Resick et al., 2009). It is often associated with 
leadership positions (Brunell et al., 2008). As such, previous leadership research has 
investigated the consequences of high narcissism in leaders by exploring the “dark side” and 
“bright side” of narcissistic leadership (Campbell et al., 2011) or its impact on strategic 
behavior and performance (e.g., Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; Resick et al., 2009). 
Accordingly, the role of CEOs’ narcissism has been of interest in strategic management 
research. For example, Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) found CEO narcissism to be 
positively associated with higher variability in firm performance. Wales et al. (2013) 
observed that narcissistic CEOs indirectly influence firm performance variance through firm 
level entrepreneurial orientation. Although prior research has made some progress in 
understanding the importance of top managers’ narcissism for firm performance, the reversed 
effect of firm performance on narcissism remains rather unexplored. Recent research in 
personnel psychology pronounced the plasticity of individuals’ personality throughout their 
adult life and influencing factors on these personality changes (Lüdtke et al., 2011; Wille & 
De Fruyt, 2014; Woods et al., 2013). Although some authors argued that contextual 
conditions might affect CEOs’ attitudes and personality (e.g., Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007), 
the prevailing paradigm in strategic management research expects an effect of CEO 
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characteristics on firm performance, and not vice versa. However, firm performance provides 
CEOs with feedback on their own abilities (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011), which might, in 
turn, affect their tendency to demonstrate narcissistic behaviors. This reciprocal relation 
between CEO narcissism and firm performance has not been studied explicitly before, but it 
is of great importance to understand the direction of causality. Otherwise, strategy researchers 
risk deriving wrong causal conclusions from their research. Accordingly, our study looks at 
both the predictive role of CEO narcissism for firm performance and the impact of firm 
performance on CEO narcissism. 
We further aim to explore the role of social status in this relationship. Actions of 
CEOs are embedded in a socially constructed system (Hayward et al., 2004; Khurana, 2002). 
Since CEOs make decisions under high levels of uncertainty, they are likely to be influenced 
by social interactions with others (Uzzi, 1997). Existing research has pointed out that 
individual behavior is influenced by their social status (Coleman, 1994; Westphal & Khanna, 
2003). We argue that social status, defined as relative position in a socially constructed 
hierarchy (Weber, 1968), is a factor that affects both narcissism and firm performance. There 
is an ongoing interest in CEOs’ social status and its impact on other executives and directors. 
For example, Allen (1974) showed that high-status CEOs have more influence on board 
discussions about director candidates. Belliveau et al. (1996) and Finkelstein et al. (2008) 
found that high-status CEOs significantly affect the compensation of executives and 
directors. While the impact of CEO’s social status on other executives and directors is 
well-understood (Belliveau et al., 1996; Finkelstein et al., 2008), there is little theory or 
research that considers whether a CEO’s social status influences their attitudes or personality. 
On the one hand, high-status CEOs tend to overestimate their strategic judgment and 
leadership capability (Park et al., 2011) and, thus, status might be positively related to CEO 
narcissism. On the other hand, narcissistic leaders tend to try ascending the ranks even if they 
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have reached the pinnacle of entrenched power (Glad, 2002). Thus, in addition to the 
predictive role of social status on CEO narcissism, we also suggest that CEO narcissism 
affects CEOs’ social status. Furthermore, research in strategic management and 
organizational theory has generated insights how CEO’s characteristics and personality 
influence organizational outcomes (e.g., Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; Resick et al., 2009), 
yet little attention was devoted on whether CEO’s social status affect strategic behavior and 
performance. We suggest that high social status is negatively associated with firm 
performance, as it induces overconfidence and hubris. In turn, prior firm performance might 
help CEOs to improve their social status, for example by getting more offers for board 
appointments. In sum, this again indicates a reciprocal effect.  
The objective of this study is to disentangle the causal relationships between a CEO’s 
social status, narcissism, and firm performance. In order to understand these causal relations, 
we employ a longitudinal design with several measurement points for social status, 
narcissism, and firm performance. The first part of our theoretical framework elaborates on 
the suggested relationships between a CEO’s social status and CEO narcissism. We suggest 
that CEOs with higher social status tend to be more narcissistic. High narcissism, in turn, is 
suggested to have a positive impact on social status. We then hypothesize on a negative effect 
of CEO narcissism and high social status on firm performance. Furthermore, we develop 
hypotheses on the influence of firm performance on a CEO’s social status and narcissism.  
2.2 Theoretical Background and Hypotheses  
2.2.1 The Relationship between a CEO’s Social Status and CEO Narcissism 
Effect of CEO Narcissism on a CEO’s Social Status. Narcissists are primarily concerned 
with their own preferences and have a positive and grandiose self-concept and self-regulating 
strategies to inflate this concept (Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001). Previous research identified a 
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number of important characteristics of highly narcissistic individuals: inflated sense of self 
value and self-importance, perception of entitlement, arrogance, want to be the center of 
attention, self-absorption and self-admiration (Ames, Rose, & Anderson, 2006; Emmons, 
1987; Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001; Resick et al., 2009). These characteristics of narcissism can 
be linked to social status.  
Social status refers to individuals’ social affiliations or their social ranking, such as 
the outside directorships in profit firms and non-profit organizations, as well as educational 
background (Finkelstein, 1992; Park et al., 2011; Westphal & Khanna, 2003). A CEO with a 
higher social status is thus someone who might have graduated from a prestigious university 
and has more board appointments at large companies and non-profit organizations. 
Narcissistic CEOs tend to obtain external self-affirmation through social interaction, 
because they have an inflated level of self-esteem (Wales et al., 2013). One way to get such 
affirmation is to be appointed to more outside directorships, thereby enhancing their social 
status. Indeed, previous research has indicated that the qualities of narcissistic individuals 
often help them to emerge as a leader (Brunel et al., 2008), and they keep pursuing leadership 
positions to fulfill their need for power and superiority (Campbell & Campbell, 2009; 
Rosenthal & Pittinsky, 2006). Because of their desire for leadership, they will seek out 
positions in profit and non-profit organizations, which are important indicators of social 
status (Finkelstein, 1992). 
Narcissistic individuals have ambitions to obtain admirable achievements (Maccoby, 
2000). Higher social status can provide narcissistic CEOs with more power and influence, 
which can facilitate the CEO’s fulfillment of their personal ambitions. Furthermore, 
narcissistic leaders tend to overestimate their self-worth and are driven by a strong desire to 
enhance their self-image via engaging in activities and conversations (Judge, Piccolo, & 
Kosalka, 2009). Highly narcissistic CEOs also try to draw attention to their vision and 
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leadership (Judge et al., 2009). Thus, by enhancing their social status, narcissistic CEOs can 
meet their desire for others’ affirmation and enhance their personal prestige. 
Compared to others, narcissistic leaders tend to display different behaviors to achieve 
their goals (Campbell et al., 2011). Some narcissistic leaders have strong social skills (Khoo 
& Burch, 2008), tend to change oriented goals, facilitate work group creativity (O'Connor, 
Mumford, Clifton, Gessner et al., 1995), and take high risks to pursue their goals (Foster & 
Trimm, 2008). They further tend to overvalue the potential gains from risky behavior (Foster 
& Trimm, 2008) and have lower quality relationships (Blair, Hoffman, & Helland, 2008). For 
narcissistic CEOs, enhancing their social status is one of their behaviors to show off their 
leadership abilities and talents. High social status can signal the CEO’s quality (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983) and proxy for their reputational capital (Kaplan & Reishus, 1990). Thus, 
narcissistic CEOs might tend to illustrate specific behaviors to demonstrate their talent and 
grand vision, such as choosing to become outside directors. 
Hypothesis 1.1. (H1.1.): CEO narcissism has a positive impact on a CEO’s social 
status. 
Effect of a CEO’s Social Status on CEO Narcissism. There is an increasing consensus that 
personality traits will continue to develop, because of individual’s experiences from careers, 
family, and social roles throughout their adult life (Lüdtke, Roberts, Trautwein, & Nagy, 
2011; Roberts et al., 2006). Helson, Kwan, John, and Jones (2002) showed that personality 
changes, such as people becoming more agreeable, conscientious, and emotionally stable, 
happen because of people’s social living, such as building their own family and career. 
Roberts, Walton, and Viechtbauer (2006) argued that personality traits can change across a 
life course. They illustrated the tendencies of changes in every dimension of adults’ Big Five 
which are openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism by using 
a meta-analysis of longitudinal studies. The primarily context driven mechanism for the 
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change in traits is Social Investment Principle which states that investing in social institution, 
such as commit to social role(e.g., work, marriage, family, community), is a driving 
mechanism of personality development (Lodi-Smithe & Roberts, 2007; Roberts, Wood, & 
Smith, 2005). More specifically, personality change is reflecting their expectations when 
people are engaging in a social role (Lodi-Smithe & Roberts, 2007; Woods, Lievens, de 
Fruyt, & Wille, 2013). 
A high social status will increase a CEO’s self-enhancement, because high-status 
CEOs in the corporate elite tend to receive more flattery and opinion conformity from others 
(Park et al., 2011). Self-enhancement is defined as the overestimation of one’s abilities 
(Kwan, John, Robins, & Kuang, 2008; Robins & Beer, 2001). It has been shown that 
self-enhancement is an important characteristic of narcissism (Sedikides, 1993; Sedikides & 
Strube, 1997), and that self-enhancement is a primary motivation for narcissistic behaviors 
(Campbell et al., 2011).  
Leaders with a high level of self-enhancement focus on their own happiness and 
success (Fu, Tsui, Liu, & Li, 2010). Note that there is a positive relationship between a CEO’s 
social status and self-enhancement. CEOs with a relatively high social status will pursue their 
own success and dominance over others. The high-status CEOs sit on more outside 
directorships, which offer them more opportunities to receive social praise. For CEOs, social 
praise possesses various forms. Flattery and applause tend to make the CEOs overestimate 
their talent (Koestner, Zuckerman, & Koestner, 1987). Furthermore, media outlets tend to 
overemphasize the role of CEOs. Hence, we think that the high-status CEOs have an 
increased likelihood of thinking that they are grandiose and predominant. As such, they might 
overestimate their performance and leadership potential after receiving social praise. This 
will create an inflated sense of self-value and self-importance in the CEOs, both of which are 
important characteristics of narcissistic individuals (Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001). Therefore, 
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high-status CEOs might become more narcissistic after getting social praise. 
Hypothesis 1.2. (H1.2.): A CEO’s social status has a positive impact on CEO 
narcissism. 
2.2.2 The Relationship between a CEO’s Social Status, CEO Narcissism and Firm 
Performance 
Effect of a CEO’s Social Status on Firm Performance. High-status CEOs tend to be 
self-enhancing (Park et al., 2011) and maintain self-enhancing cognitions, overconfidence in 
their strategic decisions, and focus on their own success (Fu et al., 2010). Thereby, they might 
be less likely to recognize decision problems and be more likely to overestimate their ability 
to resolve the problems resulting from incorrect decisions. Ultimately, this will constrain the 
firm’s performance. In addition, CEOs with a high social status tend to have a 
disproportionate influence on the discussions about director candidates (Davis, Yoo, & Baker, 
2003; Seidel & Westphal, 2004; Useem, 1984) and for the compensation of executives and 
directors (Belliveau et al., 1996; Finkelstein et al., 2008). The disproportionate influence on 
the discussions about director candidates may lead the company to have less qualified 
directors, which might have a negative impact on firm performance. Furthermore, executives’ 
compensation arrangement could influence their behavior through their cooperation among 
TMT members (Hambrick, 1995), and willingness to cooperate across business units (Kim & 
Mauborgne, 1991). Therefore, the disproportionate compensation for executives might 
influence the way they process information, which in turn increases the chances of a series of 
negative outcomes. 
Given that high-status CEOs are, by definition, more likely to hold board 
appointments or top positions at other companies (Finkelstein, 1992; Westphal & Khanna, 
2003), they will have more outside options and their career might not be as dependent on 
Chapter 2. CEO’s Social Status, Narcissism, and Firm Performance: A Cross-lagged Analysis of  
Causal Relations 
18 
their current company. More outside options might dissipate their time and attention, thereby 
undermining their ability to lead the company. Furthermore, Core, Holthausen, and Larcker 
(1999) and Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) suggest that directors who serve on multiple 
boards can become overcommitted, which makes them unable to effectively monitor 
company effectiveness. 
Hypothesis 2.1 (H2.1): A CEO’s social status has a negative impact on firm 
performance. 
Effect of CEO Narcissism on Firm Performance. Many studies have made efforts to 
elaborate on the influence of narcissism on firm performance. Resick et al. (2009) found that 
narcissism has no significant relationship with team performance, while Chatterjee and 
Hambrick (2007) illustrated that CEO narcissism is positively associated with extreme and 
varying company performance. Furthermore, Wales et al. (2013) observed that 
entrepreneurial orientation partially explains why narcissistic CEOs led the companies to 
experience extreme gains or losses. Thus, existing research shows a mixed picture of the 
influence of CEO narcissism on firm performance. Narcissistic CEOs have inflated 
self-views and might overestimate the likelihood of the success of strategic initiatives. In 
addition, by influencing other directors’ decisions, the narcissistic CEO might distort strategic 
choices.  
In order to pursue their high goals, narcissistic CEOs might take advantage of others 
(Khoo & Burch, 2008) and may have lower quality relationships with incumbent managers 
(Blair et al., 2008). With the disposition of higher levels of arrogance and self-admiration, 
narcissistic CEOs seem unlikely to communicate with staff equitably (Resick et al., 2009). In 
addition, since being boastful, narcissistic CEOs are not encouraging the staff to propose 
comments or suggestions on their decisions (Bass, 1998). Disharmonic relationships between 
the CEO and the company members could have a long and negative influence on firm 
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performance. Furthermore, narcissistic CEOs do not put their energy into building a positive 
organizational culture (Hogan, Raskin, & Fazzini, 1990; Lubit, 2002). Instead, they try their 
best to enhance their public image (Bass & Steidlmeier, 1999; Conger, 1990). Moreover, 
narcissistic CEOs tend to favor highly dynamic strategies (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007), 
which mean they might carry considerable long-term costs to make themselves the center of 
attention (Resick et al., 2009). Disharmonic relationships with company members, neglect of 
organizational culture, and favoring highly dynamic strategies will have a negative influence 
on firm performance.  
The behavior of narcissistic CEOs might thus create problems for their organizations. 
Feelings of grandiosity, self-centered behaviors, and a strong desire for power that narcissistic 
CEOs typically illustrate could damage the performance of their companies (Lubit, 2002). 
Hypothesis 2.2. (H2.2.): CEO narcissism has a negative impact on firm performance. 
Effect of Firm Performance on CEO Narcissism and a CEO’s Social Status. In 
Hypotheses 2.1.and 2.2., we suggested an impact of CEO characteristics on firm outcomes. 
However, it can be argued that work outcomes might also impact individuals’ characteristics. 
For example, Woods et al. (2013) presented studies about the reciprocal influences of 
personality on work characteristics. Not only does personality determine an individual’s 
choice of work settings, the work itself can also impact an individual’s personality. We, 
therefore, suggest the effects of firm performance on a CEO’s narcissism and their social 
status.  
Recent success influences one’s sense of efficacy (Schmalensee, 1976). For CEOs, 
firm performance conveys meaning about their leadership ability and the usefulness of their 
strategy (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011). Good firm performance helps CEOs to win 
attention, applause, and get admired, which might increase their self-esteem and satisfaction 
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(Sedikides et al., 2004). When CEOs face poor performance, this will restrict their behaviors 
(Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton, 1981) and decrease their self-confidence. CEOs tend to 
attribute high performance to their own abilities (Staw, McKechnie, & Puffer, 1983). Recent 
good performance will make CEOs think that their competence and superiority were 
demonstrated, increasing their sense of accomplishment (Donaldson & Lorsch, 1985; 
Schimmer & Braue, 2012). This superiority, or arrogance, is an important factor of narcissism 
(Emmons, 1987). Thus, firm performance serves as a signal for others, as well as for the 
CEOs themselves, of how capable they are. CEOs in companies with a good performance 
will show more overconfidence and might have the tendency to be narcissistic.   
Hypothesis 2.3. (H2.3.): Firm performance has a positive impact on CEO narcissism. 
Successful CEOs will develop an increasing belief in their ability to have control over 
firm outcomes. This might lead them to believe that other organizations could also benefit 
from their talents. Furthermore, firm success can generate additional offers of board 
employment (Ferris et al., 2003), as success in their own company signals high leadership 
capabilities. CEOs of successful firms will, therefore, not only desire to increase their 
influence by joining boards of other organizations, they will also get more offers. On the 
contrary, poor performance will reduce a CEO’s confidence in their decisions and lead the 
CEOs to put their energy into improving the performance (McDonald & Westphal, 2003). 
Thus, unsuccessful CEOs will be less likely to hold outside positions, because more outside 
appointments will attract their attention and undermine their ability to lead the company. 
Hypothesis 2.4. (H2.4.): Firm performance has a positive impact on a CEO’s social 
status. 
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2.3 Methods 
2.3.1 Sample and Data Collection 
This study drew a sample from the S&P 1500. We measured CEO narcissism, social status, 
and firm performance at two points in time, 2006 and 2010. We based our decision to employ 
a time gap of four years on previous research on personality changes, which applied similar 
longitudinal designs, because personality changes have shown to need longer periods to 
become observable (Specht, Egloff, & Schmukle, 2011; Wille & De Fruyt, 2014). CEOs were 
only included if they started at the S&P 1500 company before 2006 and were still working 
for the same company as CEO in 2010. Lastly, companies were not included if they were not 
listed on COMPUSTAT or failed to file proxy statement with the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission. The final sample consists of 446 CEOs from 446 U.S. firms.  
2.3.2 Measures 
CEO’s Social Status. We used three indicators to measure a CEO’s social status (e.g., 
Finkelstein, 1992). The first indicator was the number of corporate board appointments held 
(A1).We only included boards of non-affiliated companies (Finkelstein, 1992); the number of 
board appointments was collected from company proxy statements. The second indicator was 
the number of non-profit board appointments held (A2). Both Finkelstein (1992) and Park et 
al. (2011) illustrated that non-profit board appointments were an indicator of social status. 
Useem (1979) pointed out that work for the community could reflect a manager’s 
membership of the elite. Following Finkelstein’s (1992) suggestion, CEOs had to be part of 
the top decision-making or consultative arm in the non-profit organizations and the simple 
membership in the organizations was not counted. We obtained data on the number of 
non-profit board appointments from company proxy statements. The third indicator was 
educational background (A3), as it is believed to be an important indicator of social status 
Chapter 2. CEO’s Social Status, Narcissism, and Firm Performance: A Cross-lagged Analysis of  
Causal Relations 
22 
(Finkelstein, 1992; Park et al., 2011; Westphal & Khanna, 2003). We measured elite 
education using Finkelstein’s (1992) method and their listing of 29 elite educational 
institutions. For this variable, values ranged from 0 to 3: 0, no formal higher education;1, 
undergraduate and graduate schools that were non-elite; 2, one of the undergraduate or 
graduate schools was elite; and 3, both undergraduate and graduate schools were elite. We 
obtained data on a CEO’s educational background from Marquis who’s who and company 
proxy statements. 
In our sample, the exploratory factor analysis showed that all three indicators loaded 
on a single factor (with loadings above .60). Eigenvalues were greater than one in both 2006 
and 2010, explaining 45.93 and 47.37 percent of the variance in 2006 and 2010, respectively. 
Moreover, the results from the confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) conducted with AMOS 
21.0 indicated the three factor model was saturated. 
CEO Narcissism. We used Chatterjee and Hambrick’s (2011) unobtrusive measures of 
narcissism. The first unobtrusive measure was the prominence of the CEO’s photograph on 
the company’s annual report (B1). For this variable, values ranged from 1-4: 1, there is no 
photo of the CEO on the annual report or there is no annual report in the measurement year; 
2, the CEO was photographed with other executives; 3, the CEO took the photo alone and the 
photo occupied less than a half page; and 4, the CEO took the photo alone and the photo 
occupied more than half a page. We obtained annual reports from company web sites and the 
EDGAR database to assist with this variable. The second unobtrusive measure was CEO 
prominence in company press releases (B2). This variable was the number of times the 
CEO’s name appeared on the press releases divided by the total number of the press releases. 
We obtained the press releases from Factiva. The third unobtrusive measure was the relative 
cash pay measure (B3).This variable is the CEO’s cash pay (salary and bonus) divided by the 
second-highest-paid executive in the company. As a fourth unobtrusive measure, we used the 
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relative non-cash pay (B4). This variable is the CEO’s non-cash pay (CEO’s income declared 
as “Other Compensation”) divided by the second-highest-paid executive in the company. We 
obtained compensation data from Execucomp.  
For the exploratory factor analysis, our results revealed that all four indicators loaded 
on a single factor (with loadings above .60). The eigenvalues were greater than one in both 
2006 and 2010, explaining 51.49 and 56.50 percent of the variance, respectively. Moreover, 
the confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), conducted with AMOS 21.0, indicated that the model 
fit the data adequately in the two different years, χ2 (df) <.50; Comparative Fit Index 
(CFI)>.90, Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) <.02, Root Mean Square Error 
of Approximation (RMSEA) <.05. 
Firm Performance. We used two measures of firm performance: total stock returns (TSR) 
and return on assets (ROA). TSR and ROA are arguably the most widely used indicators to 
measure firm performance (Rumelt, 1991; Schmalensee, 1985) and many studies in this area 
used TSR and/or ROA as an indicator of firm performance(Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; 
Park et al., 2011; Peterson, Galvin & Lange, 2012). TSR is a measure of the performance of 
different companies’ stocks and shares over time, calculated as changes in the stock price plus 
dividends paid, divided by the initial price of the stock. The ROA is an indicator of how 
profitable a company is relative to its total assets, calculated as the net income divided by the 
total assets. We obtained data on the TSR and the ROA from Execucomp. 
Control Variables. Control variables were included at the CEO, firm and industry level. We 
controlled for CEO gender, CEO age, and CEO tenure, because personality development and 
social status might be affected by demographic variables. CEO gender was measured as a 
binary variable (1-male, 0-female), CEO age was measured in the year when data was 
collected (in 2006 and 2010) and CEO tenure captured the number of years the CEO had held 
the position. We obtained demographic data from Execucomp and company proxy 
statements. Finkelstein (1992) illustrated that structural power had a significant relationship 
with social status. We, therefore, controlled for whether the CEO was also chairman (1-yes, 
0-no) and the percentage of stocks owned by the CEO, as both variables are indicators of 
structural power (Finkelstein, 1992). We obtained the data from Execucomp. We further 
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controlled for firm size (measured as the number of employees), firm age, and previous firm 
performance (TSR and ROA). Firm size and firm age influence the companies’ ability to 
acquire resources (Wales et al., 2013). Previous firm performance has been shown to affect 
subsequent performance (Chen, Kanfer, DeShon, and Mathieu et al., 2009). We obtained the 
data on firm size, ROA, and TSR from Execucomp. We also controlled for industry dummies 
at the SIC 2-digit level. 
2.3.3 Analysis 
We applied a multiple common factors crossed-lagged regression model within the 
framework of a structure equation model (SEM) to test the hypothesized relationships, 
because this model allowed us to examine reciprocal causality (Bentler, 1980; McDonald, 
1985; McArdle, 2009). The SEM framework takes into account error correction, factorial 
invariance, and correlated disturbances. The basic two occasion multiple common factors 
crossed-lagged regression model indicates that every factor was measured in two distinct 
times. In addition, each factor can influence the other factors in the next time period and each 
common factor influences itself overtime with a lagged auto-regression (McArdle, 2009). 
More specifically, in our model, we used this approach to test the causal directions between a 
CEO’s social status, CEO narcissism, and firm performance. The longitudinal research design 
is illustrated in Figure 2.1. 
We tested the model with AMOS 21.0, using a Generalized Least Squares to estimate 
the parameters. We examined the model fit using five widely used indices: the chi-square 
goodness-of-fit statistic, the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), the 
standardized root mean square residual (SRMR), the comparative-fit index (CFI), and the 
Tucker–Lewis index (TLI). For the RMSEA, values below 0.05 indicate an excellent fit and 
values between 0.05 and 0.08 indicate a good fit (MacCallum, Browne, & Sugawara, 1996). 
For the CFI and TLI, values above 0.95 indicate an excellent fit and values between 0.90 and 
0.95 indicate a good fit; the SRMR should be below 0.08 (Hu & Bentler, 1999). 
Chapter 2. CEO’s Social Status, Narcissism, and Firm Performance: A Cross-lagged Analysis of  
Causal Relations 
25 
Figure 2.1 The Final Structural Model 
 
Notes: (1) A3_10 was excluded from the model because the elite education (A3) was identical for all CEOs in 
2006 and 2010. (2) For reasons of simplicity, control variables are not shown in the path diagram. (3) The 
unstandardized coefficients are shown before the slash while standardized coefficients are shown after the slash; 
only significant path coefficients are reported in the figure. + p<.1,*p<.05;** p<.01;***p<.001. 
 
2.3.4 Results 
The descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations are presented in Table 2.1. In 2006, the 
correlation coefficients of the three indicators of social status ranged in value from r = 0.13 to 
r = 0.24. In 2010, they ranged from r = 0.14 to r = 0.27. All values were significant at the p < 
.01 level. In 2006, the correlation coefficient of the four indicators of narcissism ranged in 
value from r = 0.25 to r = 0.51. In 2010, they ranged from r = 0.25 to r = 0.61. The correlation 
between a CEO’s social status in 2006 and 2010 was r = 0.85, indicating a high reliability of 
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the measure. For CEO narcissism, the correlation was r = 0.59 between the two measurement 
points, which indicates a moderate to high reliability. Measures of a CEO’s social status were 
significantly correlated with each year of CEO narcissism, with correlations ranging from r = 
0.24 to r = 0.34. Regarding firm performance, CEO narcissism in 2006 had a significant 
correlation with ROA in 2010, but both ROA and TSR had no significant correlation with a 
CEO’s social status and CEO narcissism in each year.  
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Table 2.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (N=446) 
Note: Industry dummies are not shown in this table; * p< .05;** p< .01;*** p< .001. 
The results of the multiple common factors cross-lagged regression model are 
provided in Table 2.2. The results indicate that the measurement model fitted the data well. 
The overall chi-square for the model was statistically significant (χ2 (df) = 366.247(293), p < 
.01) and the values of fit indexes met our required standards (RMSEA= 0.02, SRMR= 0.03, 
CFI = 0.97, and TLI= 0.93).  
Variable Mean St.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Social status2006 0.00 2.03           
2. Social status2010 0.00 2.06 .85***          
3. Narcissism2006 0.00 2.86 .24*** .26***         
4. Narcissism2010 0.00 2.99 .33*** .34*** .59***        
5. ROA 2005 6.97 7.03 -.02 -.03 -.02 -.02       
6. ROA 2006 7.17 6.27 -.07 -.05 .01 -.01 .64***      
7. ROA 2009 3.38 7.04 .00 .01 -.01 -.01 .42*** .35***     
8. ROA 2010 5.61 6.08 -.05 -.04 -.10* -.04 .47*** .41*** .62***    
9. TSR2005 18.44 31.37 -.04 -.03 .04 .02 .19*** .27*** .06 .02   
10. TSR2006 19.92 30.46 .01 .04 -.00 .02 -.10* -.01 .03 -.01 -.17***  
11. TSR2009 38.76 57.09 -.01 -.00 -.06 -.04 .00 .01 -.03 .15*** .01 .06 
12. TSR2010 25.12 28.83 .01 -.00 -.03 .05 .01 .03 -.00 .17*** -.06 .04 
13. Gender 0.99 0.11 .02 .01 .06 .06 -.03 .06 -.01 .01 .09 .04 
14. Age 53.20 6.95 .08 .03 .10* .14** .02 .01 -.00 -.00 -.12** .03 
15. Tenure 7.04 7.09 .07 -.00 .04 .08 -.00 -.10* -.02 -.07 .05 -.08 
16. Chairman2006 0.63 0.63 .16*** .14** .15*** .10* .06 .04 .13** .07 -.05 .00 
17. Chairman2010 0.68 0.47 .13** .09 .18*** .15** .07 .05 .16** .05 -.03 -.04 
18. Stock owned2006 2.61 5.47 -.09 -.11* -.13** -.06 .12* .03 .00 .03 .00 -.02 
19. Stock owned2010 2.19 5.28 -.05 -.08 -.06 -.01 .04 -.04 -.01 .01 -.10* -.06 
20. Firm size2006 21.34 48.73 .12* .11* -.02 -.02 .04 .07 .09 .08 -.07 -.01 
21. Firm size2010 22.40 49.61 .12** .11* -.01 -.02 .05 .07 .12* .09* -.07 -.00 
22. Firm age 59.71 43.37 .15*** .11* .03 -.01 -.05 -.04 .00 -.05 -.12* -.01 
Variable 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21  
12. TSR2010 .16***            
13. Gender -.03 .04           
14. Age -.05 -.04 .06          
15. Tenure -.07 -.05 .03 .46***         
16. Chairman2006 -.05 -.02 .07 .19*** .18***        
17. Chairman2010 -.06 -.03 .11* .27*** .21***v .63**       
18. Stockowned2006 .07 -.01 .02 .21*** .48*** .06 .10*      
19. Stockowned2010 .06 .04 .02 .21*** .53*** .08 .09 .76***     
20. Firm size2006 -.05 -.08 .01 .07 -.07 .13** .16*** -.09 -.08    
21. Firm size2010 -.04 -.08 .01 .07 -.08 .12* .15*** -.09 -.08 .97***   
22. Firm age -.05 .00 -.04 .10* -.12** 09 .10* -.10* -.10* .14** .13**  
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The results from the structural model intend to illustrate the causal relationship 
between a CEO’s social status and CEO narcissism. Figure 2.1 shows that both a CEO’s 
social status and CEO narcissism in 2006 were significantly associated with a CEO’s social 
status and CEO narcissism in 2010. The results from Table 2.1 and Figure 2.1 provide strong 
support that there was a positive association between a CEO’s social status and CEO 
narcissism in both 2006 and 2010. Finally, a CEO’s social status in 2006 was positively 
associated with CEO narcissism in 2010 (std.b= 0.46, p < .001), and CEO narcissism in 2006 
was positively associated with a CEO’s social status in 2010 (std.b= 0.14, p < .10). 
Consequently, both Hypothesis 1.1 and Hypothesis 1.2 were supported. This suggests that not 
only a CEO’s social status impacts CEO narcissism but also CEO narcissism could impact a 
CEO’s social status. Hypothesis 2.1 was not supported, as a CEO’s social status was not 
associated with ROA and a CEO’s social status was positively associated with TSR (std.b= 
0.16, p < .10), which is opposite to our Hypothesis 2.1. The results in Figure 2.1 and Table 
2.2 also show that CEO narcissism in 2006 had a negative impact on ROA in 2010 (std.b = 
-0.14, p < .01). However, CEO narcissism had no significant correlation with ROA in each 
year. Therefore, Hypothesis 2.2 was not supported. Furthermore, Hypotheses 2.3 and 2.4 
were not supported, as previous ROA and TSR were not significantly related to a CEO’s 
social status and CEO narcissism. 
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Table 2.2 Summary of Path Coefficients 
 Social Status2010  Narcissism2010  ROA2010  TSR2010 
Variables b/std.b  b/std.b  b/std.b  b/std.b 
Social status2006 .74/.89*** 
(.11) 
 .40/.46*** 
(.09)
 .88/.07 
(.79)
 9.58/.16+ 
(5.35)
Narcissism2006  .19/.14+ 
(.11) 
 .64/.46*** 
(.11) 
 -2.29/-.14** 
(1.06) 
 -7.60/-.08 
(6.97) 
ROA2005 -.00/-.01 
(.00) 
 -.00/-.07 
(.00) 
 .12/.15** 
(.04) 
 -.06/-.01 
(.27) 
ROA2006 .00/.04 
(.00) 
 .00/-.00 
(.00)
 .07/.08
(.05)
 .16/.04 
(.30)
ROA2009 .00/.07 
(.00) 
 .00/.07 
(.00) 
 .48/.56*** 
(.04) 
 .10/.03 
(.24) 
TSR2005 .00/.00 
(.00) 
 .00/.06 
(.00) 
 -.01 /-.06 
(.00) 
 -.04/-.04 
(.05) 
TSR2006 .00/.05 
(.00) 
 .00/.04 
(.00) 
 -.00/-.04 
(.00) 
 .02 /.02 
(.05) 
TSR2009 .00/.03 
(.00) 
 .00/-.05 
(.00) 
 .01/.10** 
(.00) 
 .05/.09+
(.03) 
Gender -.21/-.06 
(.21) 
 .06/.02 
(.18) 
 2.94/.05 
(2.03) 
 17.95/.07 
(13.54) 
Age .00/.05 
(.00) 
 .00/.05 
(.00) 
 .00/.00 
(.04) 
 .05/.01 
(.24) 
Tenure -.01/-.21** 
(.00) 
 -.00/-.07 
(.00) 
 -.02/-.03 
(.04) 
 -.35/-.08 
(.29) 
Chairman2006 .01/.02 
(.05) 
 -.05/-.07 
(.04) 
 .17/.01 
(.44) 
 --1.96/-.04 
(2.93) 
Chairman2010 -.00/-.00 
(.06) 
 .01/.01 
(.05) 
 -.82/-.06 
(.60) 
 .56 /.00 
(3.97) 
Stock owned2006  -.00/-.08 
(.00) 
 .00/.02 
(.01) 
 .00/.00 
(.06) 
 -.39/-.08 
(.42) 
Stock owned2010 .01/.08 
.(01) 
 .01/.11 
(.01) 
 .03/.03 
(.07) 
 .81/.16+ 
(.44) 
Firm size2006 00/-.02 
(.00) 
 .00/.01 
(.00) 
 .01/.07 
(.02) 
 -.02/-.03 
(.12) 
Firm size2010 .00/.01 
(.00) 
 -.00/-.10 
(.00) 
 -.01/-.07 
(.02) 
 -.07/-.12 
(.12) 
Firm age -.00 /-.09 
(.00) 
 .00/-.07 
(.00) 
 -.01/-.06+ 
(.01) 
 -.00/-.00 
(.04) 
Notes: b indicates unstandardized path coefficients and std.b indicates standardized path coefficients; Standard 
errors are in parentheses; Industry dummies are not shown in this table; + p< .1; * p< .05;** p< .01;*** p< .001. 
Finally, as robustness checks, we used two years data for both ROA and TSR (e.g., 
2005 and 2006 ROA as two indicators of ROA2006; 2005 and 2006 TSR as two indicators of 
TSR2006). Here, results did not change substantially, revealing the same pattern of supported 
hypotheses as in previous analyses. 
We also used the difference-in-difference method to test the suggested relationships. 
The difference-in-difference method is widely used in economics to test the effects of 
changes in policy (Hausman & Kuersteiner, 2008). In the basic set up, two groups are 
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observed over two time periods: one group is the treatment group and the other group is the 
control group. The first measurement point is the pre-treatment and the second measurement 
point is the post-treatment. The difference-in-difference estimation compares the relevant 
variable of the treatment and control group in the pre- and post-treatment. The general 
difference-in-difference model is: 
     Yit = β0 + β1Pi + β2Tt +δ1PiTt + εit       (1)                           
Where: Yit is the outcome of interest and Tt is a dummy variable for the second time period. 
The dummy variable Pi reflects whether the "treatment" occurs in the second time period. The 
coefficient of the interaction term δ1 is the differential estimate. 
Based on the basic principle of the difference-in-difference method and the results 
from the cross-lagged regression model, we analyzed the causal relationships between a 
CEO’s social status and CEO narcissism (Equations (2) and (3) : 
NARit = β0 + β1socStatusit + β2Tt + δ1socStatusitTt + β3Age + β4Gender + β5Tenure + 
β6Chairman + β7Stockowned + β8Firmsize + β9Firmage + β10ROA + β11TSR + β12Industry             
(2)                                                                                    
socStatusit = β0 + β1NARit + β2Tt + δ1NARitTt + β3Age + β4Gender + β5Tenure + 
β6Chairman + β7Stockowned + β8Firmsize + β9Firmage + β10ROA + β11TSR + β12Industr              
(3)                                                                                    
Where: i indexes and t indexes represent CEO and year, respectively; NARit is CEO 
narcissism in different years; socStatusit is a CEO’s social status in different years; Tt is a 
dummy variable for the time period: Tt =1 for the year 2010 and Tt = 0 for the year 2006. The 
coefficient of the interaction term δ1 is the differential estimate. 
The results of the difference-in-difference estimation are illustrated in Tables 2.3 and 
2.4. The results indicate that the both the coefficient of socStatus*T (coef = 0.18, p < .05) and 
narcissism*T (coef = 0.08, p < .10) were significant. Hence, in line with the results reported 
above, the hypotheses are supported that a CEO’s social status impacts CEO narcissism and, 
in turn, CEO narcissism also affects CEO’s social status. 
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Table 2.3 The Effect of CEO’s Social Status on Narcissism 
 Model 1  Model 2 
Variables Coef t  Coef t 
Gender 1.35 1.51    
Age .03 1.99*    
Tenure .02 1.03    
Chairman .49 2.80***    
Stock owned -.05 -2.66**    
Firm size -.00 -1.58    
Firm age -.00 -1.29   . 
ROAt-1 -.01 -.58    
TSRt-1 -.00 -.46    
T -.24 -1.14    
Social status*T .18 1.99*  .15 1.66+ 
Social status .31 4.80***  .34 5.27*** 
R2 .15   .09  
 Note: Coef indicates coefficient; Industry dummies are not shown in this table; + p< .1; * p< .05;** p< .01;*** 
p< .001. 
Table 2.4 The Effect of CEO’s Narcissism on Social Status 
 Model 1  Modle 2 
Variables Coef t  Coef t 
Gender -.33 -.53    
Age -.00 -.41    
Tenure .02 1.84+    
Chairman .23 1.90+    
Stock owned -.03 -2.2*    
Firm size .00 3.07**    
Firm age .00 3.34***    
ROAt-1 -.00 -.29    
TSRt-1 .00 .55    
T -.15 -1.00    
Narcissism*T .08 1.74+  .06 1.37 
Narcissism .16 4.88***  .17 5.35*** 
R2 .14   .09  
Note: Coef indicates coefficient; Industry dummies are not shown in this table; + p< .1; * p< .05;** p< .01;*** 
p< .001 
2.4  Discussion 
This study attempts to disentangle the causal relationships between a CEO’s social status, 
CEO narcissism and firm performance. The cross-lagged and difference-in-difference 
examination show the reciprocal influences of CEO’s social status and CEO narcissism. That 
is, CEOs with higher social status will be more narcissistic than CEOs with a relatively lower 
social status, and high-narcissistic CEOs tend to have a higher social status. We further found 
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some support that narcissism had a negative influence on later firm performance. 
2.4.1 Causal Relationships between a CEO’s Social Status and CEO Narcissism 
An important contribution of our work is that we examine the causal relationships between a 
CEO’s social status and CEO narcissism. We found that CEO narcissism could both affect 
and be affected by CEO’s social status. First, we found that CEOs with a relatively higher 
social status will be more narcissistic than CEOs with relatively lower social status. The 
concept of narcissism has been widely discussed in the upper echelon literature. The existing 
research on narcissism has primarily focused on exploring the positive or negative 
implications of narcissism for leadership and the individual level functioning, rather than its 
antecedents (Judge et al., 2006; Kets De Vries & Miller, 1985; Maccoby, 2000). Different 
from the previous research, our work tries to clarify how or why a variation in the social 
context impacts individuals’ narcissism. Thus, this reciprocal effect of a CEO’s social status 
on CEO narcissism has important implications for the upper echelon literature. Roberts and 
Chapman (2000) found that work related experiences, such as achieving higher status, are 
associated with one’s self-confidence and responsibility. Our finding is consistent with this 
evidence in that social investment (e.g., in careers) are driving mechanisms of personality 
development (Roberts et al., 2005; Wood et al., 2013).         
Further, our results show that CEO narcissism impacts CEOs’ social status. 
Lodi-Smith and Roberts (2007) reported meta-analytic evidence that personality traits, such 
as agreeability and conscientious, might make individuals more inclined to commit to adult 
social roles. Woods et al. (2013) also pointed out that personality traits play different roles at 
different stages of individuals’ working lives. Although these studies give some examples 
how personality traits can influence individuals’ social roles, our study is the first that links 
this stream of research from personnel psychology to the strategic management literature.   
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2.4.2 The Role of a CEO’s Social Status and CEO Narcissism on Firm Performance 
Previous empirical studies have illustrated how narcissistic leaders affect firm's strategy and 
performance (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007, 2011; Resick et al., 2009). Our work 
complements this research on the effect of narcissism on firm performance in two ways. First, 
the result is consistent with the previously stated assumption (Padilla, Hogan, & Kaiser, 
2007; Rosenthal & Pittinsky, 2006) that a CEO’s personality should affect firm performance. 
Second, the present study adds to the discussion on how CEO narcissism might be a negative 
indicator of firm performance. 
Our study also complements previous work on the role of social status in 
organizations. While existing studies have primarily focused on the relationship between 
high-status CEOs and compensation for executives and directors (Belliveau et al., 1996; 
Finkelstein et al., 2008), less is known about the consequences of a CEO’s social status for 
firm performance. The results presented here show that, contrary to what we expected, no 
significant relationship between a CEO’s social status and ROA existed, but a CEO’s social 
status in 2006 was positively associated with TSR in 2010. Although there is no evidence in 
our data to support the idea that high-status CEOs will negatively affect their firm 
performance, the positive effect of social status in 2006 on TSR in 2010 illustrates a direction 
for future research. 
2.4.3 The Role of Firm Performance for a CEO’s Social Status and CEO Narcissism 
Our results also shed light on the influence of firm performance on CEO narcissism and 
social status. The empirical studies on CEO narcissism and CEO social status have primarily 
focused on how CEO narcissism or social status impacts organizational outcomes or other 
executives in the company (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; Finkelstein et al., 2008). Much 
less is known about how or why CEO narcissism and CEO social status could be impacted by 
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organizational outcomes. Our findings suggest that previous firm performance is not related 
to narcissism or social status. Although narcissism and social status might change throughout 
a person’s life, we find no evidence of firm performance being an important factor for these 
changes. 
2.4.4 Practical Implications 
Our results suggest that CEO narcissism may potentially dampen firm performance. 
Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) showed that narcissistic CEOs tend to produce a higher 
variability in firm performance (e.g., either big wins or big losses). Moreover, narcissistic 
leaders have been shown to be more likely to have unhappy employees (Blair et al., 2008) 
and inhibit information exchange in the organizations (Nevicka et al., 2011). In other words, 
having a narcissistic CEO is risky. Therefore, it is recommended that organizations attempt to 
assess narcissism in their routine screening when they select CEOs and other top managers 
(Nevicka et al., 2011). 
We also show that a CEO’s social status was positively associated with CEO 
narcissism. As mentioned previously, investing in the social role, such as a work-related 
experience, is the driving mechanism of personality development (Roberts & Chapman, 
2000; Roberts et al., 2005; Wood et al., 2013). As such, CEO narcissism might be influenced 
by the work environment; their higher narcissism might have been developing during their 
career. Park et al. (2011) pointed out that CEOs with relatively high social status have 
potentially negative influence on performance. Furthermore, high-status CEOs exert a 
disproportionate influence over the election and compensation decision of directors (Allen, 
1974; Belliveau et al., 1996; Finkelstein et al., 2008; Useem, 1984). Hence, a CEO that holds 
directorship in multiple companies could not monitor many firms effectiveness and could 
also enhance their tendency of narcissism. 
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2.4.5 Limitations and Further Research 
Like any study, our work has several limitations. The first limitation is that we only examined 
the causal relationships of a CEO’s social status, CEO narcissism and firm performance 
among CEOs from United States companies. The United States has its distinct culture and 
economic background, and it grants considerable managerial discretion, because of its 
individualism and tolerance for uncertainty (Hofstede, 2001). Thus, our conclusions might 
not extend to non-United States samples. As such, it could be interesting for further research 
to analyze these relationships in other cultural contexts. We also recommend that future 
studies investigate to what extent the level of managerial discretion impacts our findings. 
The second limitation is that the measures of social status and CEO narcissism in our 
study rely on unobtrusive indicators. Although these indicators have been successfully used 
in other research, the unobtrusive indicators are only partial and indirect indicators of social 
status and narcissism. Therefore, even though the psychometric properties of our measures 
for narcissism and a CEO’s social status were sufficient, they may need additional validation 
and refinement. In future research, the social status index and narcissism index could 
therefore be revised or new unobtrusive indicators could be identified. Additionally, TSR, as 
one indicator of firm performance, has a relatively low reliability in our sample. Because 
TSR is a measure of the stock price change, it varies considerably over the years. Future 
research might also include return on investment (ROI) and return on sales (ROS) (Tang, 
Crossan, and Rowe, 2011) as indicators of firm performance. 
The third limitation is that we only focus on the CEO level. Studying the effects of 
CEO narcissism or social status on those individuals who interact most closely with CEOs 
might be important as well. For example, how is CEO narcissism or social status linked to 
processes in the top management team? Chen (2011) examined the moderated effect of 
independent directors on the TMT characteristics – internationalization relationship. Carmeli 
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and Schaubroek (2006) pointed out that TMT behavior integration could affect the quality of 
strategic decisions. Kinicki, Jacobson, Galvin, and Prussia (2011) also found that the process 
by which CEOs create vertical and horizontal alignments of goals across organizational levels 
could influence firm performance. It would thus be interesting to study how narcissistic 
CEOs or high-status CEOs approach goal alignment and strategic implementation. On the 
contrary, board power might also influence a CEO’s decisions. The primary responsibility of 
the board is to monitor the management of the firm (Eisenhardt, 1989), which includes 
monitoring the CEO and strategy implementation (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). The effects of 
CEO narcissism might therefore be influenced by board power and other organizational 
characteristics. Future research might examine these influencing factors on a CEO’s 
decision-making processes. 
Finally, financial incentives should be considered in the future research. Finkelstein et 
al. (2008) pointed out CEOs with a high social status influence the compensation for 
executives and directors (Belliveau et al., 1996). O'Reilly III, Doerr, Caldwell, and Chatman 
(2014) found that more narcissistic CEOs with longer tenure will receive more total direct 
compensation and will have larger discrepancies between their own compensation and the 
other executives of their team. It would also be valuable to understand the moderating role of 
social status and narcissism on how pay arrangements alter a CEO’s behaviors. 
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CHAPTER 3 
3 The Dynamic of CEO-Board Relationships: Board Power, 
CEO Narcissism, and Their Effect on Company Strategy 
3.1 Introduction 
CEOs and corporate boards of directors play an important role in corporate management, 
exercising their influence through their formal and informal power (Pfeffer, 1992). However, 
both the CEO and the board of directors tend to consolidate and increase their power and 
influence over company decision-making, often resulting in a political struggle between the 
CEO and the board of directors (e.g., Ocasio, 1994; Wade, O’Reilly, & Chandratat, 1990; 
Zajac & Westphal, 1994). In this study, we combine arguments from agency theory, 
institutionalization of power, and circulation of power approaches to gain a better 
understanding of the CEO-board relationship and its long-term consequences. Agency theory 
emphasizes that the primary function of boards is to monitor the management of benefits to 
the firm and its shareholders (Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama & Jensen, 1983), which includes 
selecting and dismissing top-management team members and evaluating their performance 
(Ruigrok, Peck, & Keller, 2006). The board is also involved in ratifying and monitoring 
corporate strategy (Carter & Lorsch, 2004; Fama & Jensen, 1983). However, existing 
research on the boards’ role has focused on board composition (e.g., independence of board 
members) and structure (e.g., duality) (Kor, 2006; Ruigrok et al., 2006). Much less is known 
about how a powerful board actually affects CEO selection and organizational strategy, 
although the effectiveness of boards’ monitoring role depends largely on the board’s power 
(Tang, Crossan & Rowe, 2011). The ongoing power struggle between a CEO and board, as 
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well as the shifting coalitions in the company, is expressed in the circulation of power 
approach (Ocasio, 1994). We draw on the institutionalization of power approach to 
emphasize the ability of powerful individuals in the corporation to assert their formal 
authority.  
We are interested in the role that CEO narcissism plays in the dynamic relationship 
between board and the CEO. Narcissism is the degree to which an individual has an inflated 
self-view and strives to continuously reinforce this self-view (Campbell & Miller, 2011; 
Judge, LePine, & Rich, 2006). Narcissistic individuals tend to be arrogant, self-serving, and 
power-oriented (Blair, Hoffman, & Helland, 2008). They are also inclined to devalue others, 
react aggressively to criticism (Paulhus & Williams, 2002), and take bold and risky actions to 
garner attention and admiration (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007). CEO narcissism might thus 
be a key concept when analyzing power struggles between a board and CEO. Prior research 
on CEO succession has focused primarily on the potential differences between outside 
successors and insider successor (e.g., Boeker & Goodstein, 1993; Cannella & Lubatkin, 
1993), as well as demographic characteristics of new CEOs (e.g., Zajac & Westphal, 1996). 
Only recently has attention shifted toward CEO personality traits under the premise that it is 
arguably more important to understand CEO behavior than demographic characteristics 
(Engelen, Neumann, & Schmidt, 2013; Nadkarni & Herrmann, 2010). For example, Goel and 
Thakor (2008) argue that an overconfident manager is more likely than a rational manager to 
be promoted to CEO under value-maximizing corporate governance. However, narcissism is 
an important characteristic that has not been analyzed in the CEO-succession context. We 
examine this relationship and suggest that a powerful board tends to not hire narcissistic 
CEOs, as these CEOs might not support their strategic direction, might weaken their power, 
and might negatively influence the company’s overall performance. 
Furthermore, we are interested in CEOs’ impact on board power after appointment. 
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With regard to CEO narcissism, prior research analyzed how CEOs manage their 
relationships with the board by selecting new directors who have similar narcissistic 
tendencies or prior experience with narcissistic CEOs (Zhu & Chen, 2014b). However, little 
theoretical or empirical research has examined the role of CEOs’ narcissism as it relates to 
board power following the appointment of a CEO. Given that a powerful board imposes 
important restraints on CEOs’ strategic decision-making (Tang et al., 2011) and there are 
power struggles between CEOs and boards of directors, it is thus important to analyze how 
narcissistic CEOs influence board power and how boards to restrain CEOs’ decision-making 
abilities. Thus, our first research goal is to examine the reciprocal relationship between board 
power and CEO narcissism. 
As it is related to the CEO-board power struggle and boards’ monitoring function, we 
are interested in determining if a powerful board might hinder narcissistic CEOs’ intentions 
to change the company’s strategic choices. Existing studies have elaborated on the influence a 
CEO’s personality has over a company’s strategy choices. For example, Chatterjee and 
Hambrick (2007) demonstrated that narcissistic CEOs are positively associated with strategic 
dynamism and grandiosity. However, Park, Westphal and Stern (2011) argued that CEOs’ 
self-enhancement is negatively associated with strategic change in response to low firm 
performance. Thus, although there is agreement that CEO personality can affect a firm’s 
strategy-making decisions, existing research is inconsistent with regard to the direction and 
contextual factors of this relationship. We intend to fill this research gap. First, we argue that 
narcissistic CEOs favor strategic change after their appointment, which is rooted in their 
overconfidence and strong desire for power. We then argue that powerful boards tend to 
weaken the effect of CEO narcissism on strategic change. Since strategic change is 
considered riskier than extant strategies (Jauch, Osborne, & Gleuck, 1980), a powerful board 
that acts in the interest of shareholders will tend to prevent strategic change whenever it 
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doubts its usefulness. The behaviors of powerful boards that strive to weaken the effects of 
CEO narcissism on strategic change reflect the power struggle between CEOs and boards. 
Thus, a powerful board might not hire a highly narcissistic CEO who favors strategic change 
to garner attention and admiration in the first place, or might reject strategic change initiated 
by a narcissistic CEO. 
Overall, this study makes several important contributions to the strategic-management 
literature. First, our study aims to uncover a dynamic process that incorporates both the 
predictive role of board power on hiring narcissistic CEOs, and the effect of CEO narcissism 
on board power based on agency, power institutionalization, and power circulation theories. 
Second, in view of the primary monitoring role that boards may play in changing the 
direction of company strategy, our study extends the work of Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) 
by arguing that board power is not only affected by CEO narcissism, but also moderates the 
CEO narcissism–strategic change relationship. Finally, our study strives to elaborate on the 
relationship between strategic change and firm performance. This reciprocal and dynamic 
relationship is reflected in our research framework (see Figure 3.1).  
Figure 3.1 Overview of the Research Model 
 
Note: (1) t-1is One year before the CEO was appointed; t+1 is one year after the CEO was appointed; t+2 
is two years after the CEO was appointed; t+3 is three years after the CEO was appointed (2) For reasons 
of simplicity, control variables are not shown in the path diagram. 
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3.2 Theoretical Background and Hypotheses  
Agency Theory. Agency theory contends that a board’s primary function is to monitor the 
actions of managers to protect owners’ interests (Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
Board incentives are the primary prerequisite of the monitoring function, and boards will 
monitor management effectively when their incentives are aligned with shareholders’ 
interests (Fama, 1980; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Walters, Kroll, & 
Wright, 2008). Hillman and Dalziel (2003) pointed out that one important proxy of board 
incentive is board dependence. Previous studies have shown that there is a preference for a 
dominance of external independent directors because a board’s willingness and ability to 
monitor management effectively is related to board members’ independence (Dalton et al., 
2008; Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983). Agency theorists have also argued that the 
separation of the CEO and the board improves monitoring by ensuring independent and 
vigilant oversight (Krause & Semadeni, 2013). A powerful board is characterized by a higher 
proportion of outside directors, a high level of equity holding among outside directors, and an 
independent leadership structure (i.e., separation of CEO and board chairperson) (Datta, 
Musteen, & Herrmann, 2009; Hayward & Hambrick 1997). Based on agency theory, a 
powerful board can more effectively fulfill its monitoring role and be more effective in 
aligning the interests of owners and managers when these characteristics are present. 
Institutionalization of Power and Circulation of Power. The institutionalization of power 
and circulation of power theories were developed to explain political dynamics (e.g., Ocasio, 
1994; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1977). The power institutionalization theory portrays the abilities 
of powerful individuals in a corporation to entrench their formal authority and to increase 
their control of the corporation while limiting others’ authority and control of the corporation 
over time (Ocasio, 1994; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1977). There are three interrelated processes 
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that may lead to the institutionalization of power (Ocasio, 1994; Pfeffer, 1981): the escalation 
of commitment to a course of action; the taking for granted of an incumbent’s power; and the 
maintenance and consolidation of power by incumbents through increased resources.  
In contrast to the power institutionalization theory, which emphasizes the 
institutionalization and perpetuation of power, the power circulation theory emphasizes the 
shifting coalitions and continual power struggle in a company (Ocasio, 1994). There is 
emergent and recurrent conflict, circulation, and change in organizations, as diverse corporate 
elites (e.g., a corporation’s senior executives or top management) contend for control over the 
organization’s dominant coalition (Hambrick, 1994; Zald & Berger, 1978). Power circulation 
suggests that individual and group power is unstable because there are political obstacles 
arising from power contests initiated by other corporate elites (Ocasio, 1994). The circulation 
of power is guided by the interplay of two underlying mechanisms: obsolescence and 
contestation (Ocasio, 1994). Obsolescence implies that organizational elites might become 
outdated because they are unable to adequately adapt to environmental contingencies (Miller, 
1991). Contestation refers to the emergent and continual struggle for position, control, and 
power among competing factions and organizational elites (White, 1992). Power circulation 
challenges the institutionalization of power theory, which assumes that organizational elites 
can perpetuate and consolidate their power, by arguing that the power of organizational elites 
is subject to challenge, political struggle, and contestation (Ocasio, 1994; Pareto, 1968). 
Previous studies on the institutionalization of power and circulation of power theories 
focused on how incumbent CEOs maintain and perpetuate their power (e.g., Ocasio, 1994), 
and how incumbent CEOs face the risk of power contests initiated by non-CEO executives 
and outside directors (e.g., Ocasio, 1994; Shen & Cannella, 2002). We assume that the 
contest occurs not only among executives, but also between CEOs and boards. We have thus 
moved beyond previous research by applying the two theories and combining them with 
Chapter 3. The Dynamic of CEO-Board Relationships: Board Power, CEO Narcissism, and Their 
Effect on Company Strategy 
43 
agency theory to examine CEO-board relations. From the perspective of agency theory, 
boards tend to not hire a CEO who might have a potential negative influence on the firms and 
their shareholders. Additionally, highly narcissistic CEOs who dominate their relations with 
the boards will impair the boards’ power and prevent boards from restraining their decisions. 
From the perspectives of power institutionalization and power circulation, both the board and 
the CEO will try to consolidate their power over time; at the same time, there is also latent 
and overt power and control struggles between a board and a new CEO. A powerful board 
will try increase, or at least maintain its overall power in its relationship with the CEO so that 
they will be not hiring a new CEO who might weaken their power and control over the 
company. On the other hand, narcissistic CEOs who have a strong desire for power and 
domination will be more likely to exploit power in order to gain ultimate control over the 
board.  
CEO Narcissism. Early studies tended to classify narcissism as a pathological disorder 
(Freud, 1957). Later studies have widely conceptualized narcissism as a personality 
dimension on which all individuals can be placed (Emmons, 1984; Raskin & Terry, 1988). 
Previous research found that narcissists are primarily concerned with their own preferences 
and have a positive and grandiose self-concept and use self-regulating strategies to inflate this 
concept (Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001). Researchers demonstrated that highly narcissistic 
individuals tend to be associated with arrogance, self-absorption, self-admiration, an inflated 
sense of self-value, a sense of entitlement and a sense of superiority (Ames, Rose, & 
Anderson, 2006; Emmons, 1987; Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001; Resick et al., 2009). These 
qualities often help narcissistic individuals to emerge as leaders (Brunell, et al., 2008). Some 
studies have even argued that a high level of narcissism is a fundamental personality trait of 
CEOs (Judge et al., 2006). Many existing studies have focused on examining narcissism at 
the CEO level. For instance, Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) found that narcissistic CEOs 
Chapter 3. The Dynamic of CEO-Board Relationships: Board Power, CEO Narcissism, and Their 
Effect on Company Strategy 
44 
tend to favor bold actions and highly dynamic strategies. Chatterjee and Hambrick (2011) 
argued that highly narcissistic CEOs are less responsive to objective indicators of their 
performance and more responsive to social praise. Gerstner et al. (2013) argued that 
narcissistic CEOs tend to be relatively aggressive toward technological discontinuities. 
Further, Zhu and Chen (2014a) found that narcissistic CEOs tend to rely more on their own 
prior experiences and less on the other directors’ prior experiences when deciding the focal 
firm’s corporate strategies. CEO narcissism has also been argued to be associated with 
director selection (Zhu & Chen, 2014b).  
3.2.1 The Relationship between Board Power and the Selection of Narcissistic CEOs 
Boards of directors play an important role when a firm selects a new CEO (Lorsch & 
MacIver, 1989). Borokhovich, Parrino and Trapani (1996) found that there is a positive 
relationship between the percentage of outside directors and the frequency of outside CEO 
successions. Furthermore, a more powerful board is more likely to select new CEOs with 
demographic characteristics that are similar to board members (Zajac & Westphal, 1996). A 
qualified CEO is important for a firm because he or she might affect the quality of the 
information available to the board of directors and investors (Adams & Ferreira, 2007), the 
firm’s subsequent corporate investment decisions (Song & Thakor, 2006), and the overall 
direction of the firm (Goel & Thakor, 2008).  
Based on agency theory, the primary driver behind the decision to hire a qualified 
CEO is the obligation to ensure that management acts in the shareholders’ best interests 
(Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Walters et al., 2008). The negative consequences of narcissistic 
leaders have been well documented in previous research. For example, Bass and Steidlmeier 
(1999) pointed out that narcissistic CEOs might try to enhance their public image rather than 
focusing on achieving organizational goals. Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) found that 
narcissistic CEOs are more likely to produce financial volatility and wide fluctuations in firm 
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performance (e.g., either big wins or big losses). Resick et al. (2009) considered narcissism as 
one of the dark-side personality characteristics and stated that narcissistic CEOs demonstrate 
less-contingent reward leadership behaviors. A powerful board is more independent of the 
current management of the firm and usually puts shareholders’ interests first. Thus, a 
powerful board is particularly vigilant and actively monitors company management; it is 
therefore more likely to search for the best possible CEO candidate. Since highly narcissistic 
CEOs might have a negative influence on the company and hurt shareholders’ interests, a 
powerful board will not take the risk of hiring a highly narcissistic CEO. 
Furthermore, to enhance social integration and carry out their monitoring role, boards 
prefer to appoint a CEO who will have efficient and frequent communication with the board 
(O'Reilly, Caldwell & Barnett, 1989; Useem & Karabel, 1986). Narcissistic leaders have been 
shown to inhibit information exchange in organizations (Nevicka et al., 2011). As they are 
generally disposed to exhibit arrogance and self-admiration, narcissistic leaders tend to resist 
others’ suggestions (Hogan, Raskin & Fazzini, 1990), and are unlikely to communicate with 
others equitably (Resick et al., 2009). Moreover, since narcissistic individuals need to feel 
superior, they tend to be dominant in interactions with others (Paulhus & Williams, 2002). 
Thus, relatively powerful boards that play a large role in the CEO selection process are likely 
to be more influential in exercising their own preferences (Zajac & Westphal, 1996). They 
will, therefore, be less likely to choose highly narcissistic CEOs who tend to be dominant in 
their communication with boards and hinder information availability, which makes it more 
difficult for boards to pursue their monitoring role. 
The effectiveness of a board’s role in monitoring and controlling company 
decision-making on behalf of shareholders depends on the board’s power. According to the 
institutionalization of power theory, board power is likely to increase when a board appoints a 
qualified CEO. Hiring a qualified CEO leads to an escalation of commitment to the board and 
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a taking for granted of its power, which in turn increases the probability that the board’s 
power will be maintained. Therefore, in order to maintain and consolidate its power, a board 
will exert its influence to avoid hiring a narcissistic CEO, as highly narcissistic CEOs carry a 
high probability of bringing about negative outcomes for the company. According to the 
model of the circulation of power, the board of directors is a shifting political coalition, as its 
members might be changed and replaced over time (Ocasio, 1994). CEOs play an important 
role in director selection (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Mace, 1971). Thus, CEO succession and 
selection might trigger a latent contest for power and control between boards and CEOs 
following a CEO’s appointment. Since narcissistic individuals have a strong desire for power 
and tend to be dominant in making company decisions (Rosenthal & Pittinsky, 2006), highly 
narcissistic CEOs are more likely to constrain board power after they are appointed by the 
board. In order to maintain and increase their overall power in relationship to the CEO and 
control over management behavior and strategic decision-making, a powerful board will not 
select a new CEO who might challenge its power and control. 
In contrast to a highly powerful board, a less powerful board is ineffective in 
monitoring and controlling the CEO selection progress and firm management in general 
because a less-powerful board often depends on current management and does not have the 
same incentive and power that a high-power board has. It has been shown that a dominance 
of insiders and a relatively high concentration of power at the top lead to ineffective 
monitoring and possible opportunistic behavior on the part of managers (Beatty & Zajac, 
1994). Thus, with a less-powerful board, the company might appoint a highly narcissistic 
CEO who has close personal or business ties with the top management. 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Board power is negatively associated with the selection of 
narcissistic CEOs. 
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3.2.2 The Relationship between CEO Narcissism and Board Power 
CEOs play an important role in the director-selection process (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; 
Mace, 1971). The selection of a new director is the outcome of a bargaining process between 
the CEO and the existing board (Arthur, 2001). Additionally, the outcome of the negotiation 
process reflects CEO dominance in some firms and board control in others (Withers, Hillman 
& Cannell, 2012). CEOs tend to choose directors with whom they have personal relationships 
(Fredrickson, Hambrick, & Baumrin, 1988; Mace, 1971) or directors who are likely to be 
compliant (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998). Directors who closely monitor management are 
avoided (Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009). Zajac and Westphal (1996) similarly 
found that a high-power CEO is less likely to appoint existing directors for future 
appointments at firms if they are inclined to reduce CEO power and increase board control.  
The degree to which boards influence company management depends on board power 
relative to the top management team (TMT) and CEOs in particular (Tang et al., 2011). The 
power of the board increases its influence over a range of major decisions, and a powerful 
board imposes important restraints on a CEO’s decision outcomes (Tang et al., 2011). Thus, a 
powerful board is more likely to reject a CEO’s proposal. Narcissists have an inflated sense 
of themselves and tend to believe they are talented, intelligent, competitive, creative, and in 
possession of strong leadership skills (John & Robins, 1994; Judge, LePine, & Rich, 2006). 
Rooted in their inflated sense of themselves, narcissists are unwilling to be rejected by the 
boards. Therefore, when CEOs possess higher levels of narcissism, they are more likely to 
reduce board power to prevent the board from restraining their decisions. Moreover, 
narcissistic individuals tend to dominate and control every activity because of their need to 
prove their superiority (Campbell, 1999; Kets de Vries & Miller, 1985; Paulhus & Williams, 
2002). Social psychology research revealed that narcissistic leaders are especially motivated 
to reduce the impact of other group members’ influence on teams’ decision outcomes 
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(Nevicka et al., 2011) and tend to be dominant in making task-related decisions to garner 
admiration and applause (Campbell & Miller, 2011). A highly narcissistic CEO may be 
especially dominant in interactions with the board of directors and may also be more likely to 
reduce a board’s influence on company management in order to ensure the CEO’s dominance 
in making major corporate decisions.  
Research on narcissism has revealed that power is one of the most important 
motivators for narcissistic leaders (Rosenthal & Pittinsky, 2006). Narcissistic individuals 
have a strong desire to garner power to support their grand needs and visions (Campbell et al, 
2011). Glad (2002) also argued that narcissistic leaders tend to obtain power to ascend the 
ranks; they keep craving and seeking power even when they have reached the pinnacle of 
entrenched power. Further, Maccoby (2000) demonstrated that narcissistic individuals try to 
realize admirable achievements. For narcissistic CEOs, enhancing their power in the 
company could therefore help them implement their grandiose plans and fulfill personal 
ambitions. Therefore, a highly narcissistic CEO is likely to have stronger power motivation 
than other CEOs. The institutionalization of power theory posits that CEOs might use their 
power and position to consolidate and perpetuate their power (Ocasio, 1994). Additionally, 
CEO power tends to increase over the period of their incumbency (Ocasio, 1994). CEOs with 
more power than the board can more convincingly argue their positions and generally have 
greater control over the outcomes of board decisions. As a result, they may control company 
management. Thus, narcissistic CEOs who have greater power motivation are likely to reduce 
a board’s power in order to increase their own influence over corporate decisions.  
The power circulation theory emphasizes the impermanence and contestation of the 
organizational elites’ power (Ocasio, 1994). According to the power circulation theory, the 
power of the CEO is subject to contestation (Ocasio, 1994). The board of directors may also 
constrain the CEO’s power and control (Ocasio, 1994; Shen & Cannella, 2002; Seidel & 
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Westphal, 2004). The power of a CEO can best be contested when the board is powerful. 
Since the degree to which CEOs influence corporate governance decisions depends on CEO 
power relative to boards (Zajac & Westphal, 1996), and a powerful board could limit the 
possibility of the CEO exerting social influence to maintain and increase his or her power, 
highly narcissistic CEOs with a strong desire for power are motivated to compete for power 
with boards in the corporate world and for control over a company’s strategic 
decision-making process after they are appointed. Therefore, more narcissistic CEOs that are 
driven by their underlying power orientation are more likely to reduce a board’s power by, for 
example, appointing fewer independent outside directors to obtain self-affirmation and 
enhance their own influence over company management. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): CEO narcissism is associated with decreases in board power. 
3.2.3 CEO Narcissism, Board Power, Strategic Change and Firm Performance 
The literature on strategic leadership has provided considerable evidence that CEO 
characteristics affect the firm’s strategic direction. For instance, studies have shown that 
CEOs’ demographic characteristics, such as education, age, functional background, and 
tenure, influence their tendencies to implement new ideas (Datta, Rajagopalan & Zhang, 
2003; Miller, 1991). Other studies have shown that CEO pay and CEO dominance influence 
firms’ strategic direction (Carpenter, 2000; Tang et al., 2011). Together, these studies indicate 
that a firm’s CEO, as an important member of the firm’s dominant coalition, has an impact on 
the company’s strategic choice (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Peterson et al., 2003).  
Moreover, research has shown that a CEO’s personality influences how information is 
filtered and interpreted, as well as related conditions and stimuli, and, finally, how it impacts 
company decisions (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Nadkarni and Herrmann (2010) found that 
CEO extraversion, emotional stability, and openness to experiences are positively associated 
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with strategic flexibility, whereas CEO conscientiousness inhibits strategic flexibility. 
Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) demonstrated that CEO narcissism is positively related to 
strategic dynamism and grandiosity in computer hardware and software industries. Research 
on narcissism has further shown that relatively high-level narcissistic leaders have a strong 
desire to draw attention to their vision and leadership and are more likely to strive for bold, 
daring, and highly visible initiatives (Judge et al., 2009). Since narcissistic leaders have 
inflated self-views and tend to believe they are talented, intelligent, competitive, creative, and 
in possession of strong leadership skills (John & Robins, 1994; Judge, LePine, & Rich, 
2006), narcissistic CEOs are more likely to feel confident about their understanding of 
corporate strategy, and they tend to change a company’s current strategy to demonstrate their 
superior abilities. Further, narcissists are driven by an overwhelming desire for superiority 
(Campbell, 1999), applause, and affirmation (Engelen et al., 2013). To fulfill these needs, 
narcissistic CEOs are more likely to initiate change rather than maintain stability. Engelen et 
al. (2013) demonstrated that narcissistic CEOs tend to embrace change and allocate firm 
resources accordingly. Thus, a more narcissistic CEO is more likely to initiate strategic 
change, a tendency that is rooted in the characteristics of relatively high-level narcissists. 
The institutionalization power theory suggests that CEOs strive to consolidate and 
perpetuate their own power during their tenure (Ocasio, 1994). Highly narcissistic CEOs who 
are driven by a strong desire for power and control are more likely to consolidate their power 
after they are appointed. Initiating strategic change helps CEOs explore new opportunities, 
expand resources, and establish networks of influence in ways that institutionalize and 
perpetuate their power. According to the power circulation theory, newly appointed CEOs are 
surrounded by senior executives and boards of directors who also have strong needs for 
power and control and are viewed as rivals of the CEO. Even when a firm is successful, 
highly narcissistic CEOs who tend to dominate and control a company’s decision-making will 
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still be drawn toward changing company strategy after they are appointed, as a change in 
current strategy reflects a successful power and control contest against senior executives and 
the board of directors. In these situations, narcissistic CEOs will tend to change company 
strategy after they are appointed. 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): CEO narcissism is positively associated with strategic change. 
Boards of directors should prevent managers from engaging in opportunistic, 
self-interested behaviors (Jensen, 1993; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Since outside directors 
emphasize financial outcomes and have a desire to protect their own personal reputation, they 
have more motivation to pursue their monitoring role (Hill & Snell, 1988; Finkelstein & 
D’Aveni, 1994). A powerful board means a higher proportion of outside directors, high equity 
holding of outside directors, and leadership structures that are independent of the current 
CEO, and thus are in a better position to fulfill their responsibilities.  
Studies of boards have acknowledged that boards play an important role in the 
strategic behavior of firms (Bacon, 1993; Berenbeim, 1995). In arriving at strategic decisions, 
the board is involved in defining, selecting and implementing corporate strategy (Pearce & 
Zahra, 1992; Stiles & Taylor, 2001), and its main function is ratification and monitoring 
(Carter & Lorsch, 2004). Strategic change includes major organizational restructuring (Lant, 
Milliken, & Batra, 1992); it requires increased effort and is perceived as riskier than extant 
strategies (Jauch et al., 1980). Further, Carpenter (2000) argued that it is more difficult for 
stakeholders to evaluate a company if a strategy deviates from strategic norms established by 
the firm. Thus, strategic change is less defensible than a conformist strategy in the board’s 
deliberation (Tang et al., 2011). According to agency theory, boards should ensure that CEOs 
carry out their managerial responsibilities in the best interests of shareholders (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983). Therefore, a powerful board may reject strategic change, even though highly 
narcissistic CEOs tend to advance strategy change to meet their need for superiority, 
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applause, and affirmation. Conversely, a less-powerful board might have a higher proportion 
of inside directors and the CEO might also serve as chairman of the board. It has been shown 
that inside directors might hesitate to oppose a CEO’s strategic proposals because the CEO 
plays an important role in their career advancement (Ruigrok et al., 2006). All in all, a CEO’s 
effect on strategic change is likely to be weakened by powerful boards. 
Power circulation theory suggests that CEO power might be contested by non-CEO 
senior executives as well as by outside directors (Ocasio, 1994; Shen & Cannella, 2002). A 
powerful board does not need to engage in intensive, explicit monitoring and disciplinary 
activities to influence a CEO’s decision-making (Tang et al., 2011). A powerful board that 
wants to maintain and increase its overall power and control over company decision-making 
tends to counter the power of the CEO, and thus challenge the CEO’s decisions. Highly 
narcissistic CEOs who tend to initiate strategic change regardless of whether or not a firm is 
performing successfully after they are appointed will be more likely to be subject to challenge 
and contestation from a powerful board. Therefore, a powerful board that has a strong need to 
maintain and increase power and control is more likely to reject strategic change to maintain 
its power over a CEO. 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): The effect of CEO narcissism on strategic change is weakened by 
a powerful board. 
The literatures on the relationship between strategic change and firm performance 
yielded inconsistent results. Some studies found that strategic change positively influences 
performance (Haveman, 1992; Zajac & Kraatz, 1993), while others found that strategic 
change has a negative influence on performance (Singh, House, & Tucker 1986). 
Additionally, some studies found that there is no relationship between strategic change and 
firm performance (Kelly & Amburgey, 1991). Therefore, it is difficult to say whether 
strategic change enhance or reduce firm performance. But existing research has recognized 
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that organizational conditions under which strategic change is initiated and implemented 
could moderate the effect of strategic change on firm performance (Rajagopalan & Spreitzer, 
1997). For example, Virany, Tushman, & Romanelli (1992) pointed out that executive 
leadership is important in understanding the effect of strategic change on performance. Zhang 
and Rajagopalan (2010) stated that CEO origin moderates the relationship between strategic 
change and firm performance. We develop a similar argument and suggest that CEO 
narcissism might moderate the impact of strategic change on firm performance. That is, 
strategic change initiated by narcissistic CEOs will have a negative effect on firm 
performance, as it is intended to improve CEOs’ public image rather than organizational 
outcomes. 
Company strategy change needs to align a firm’s strengths and weaknesses with the 
problems and opportunities in its environment (Andrews, 1971). Further, strategic change 
requires increased effort, knowledge, and spending to build new capabilities and acquire new 
resources (Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2010), and leaders need to be aware of the possible loss of 
alternatives when they make choices (Amihud & Lev, 1981). The reason narcissistic CEOs 
initiate strategic change is often because they seek to demonstrate their superior ability and 
win power contests with other executives and boards of directors. Thus, narcissistic CEOs 
have incentives to change company strategy but show little concern about the possibility of 
significant losses. 
Hypothesis 5 (H5): CEO narcissism moderates the effect of strategic change on firm 
performance. 
3.3 Methods 
3.3.1 Sample and Data Collection 
Our sample frame included companies on the 2012 S&P Composite 1500 list. First, we 
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confined our sample to CEOs who started their tenure (designated as year t) at the S&P 1500 
between 2007 and 2010 and held their position for at least two years. Second, we only 
included companies whose net sales are greater than $40 million because larger firms have a 
more formal governance structure at the top (Tang et al., 2011). Finally, we did not include 
companies that were not listed on COMPUSTAT, or if they failed to file proxy statement with 
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. The final sample consisted of 254 CEOs from 
254 U.S. firms.  
Our hypotheses imply a lagged model structure. To measure CEOs’ narcissistic 
tendencies, we used data from the second year of each CEO’s tenure (t+1) rather than the first 
year because the first year often has anomalies associated with succession (Chatterjee & 
Hambrick, 2007). We measured board power in three separate years: one year before the CEO 
was appointed (t-1); one year after the CEO was appointed (t+1); and two years after the 
CEO was appointed (t+2). Strategic change was measured in (t+2), and firm performance was 
measured in (t+3). 
3.3.2 Measures 
CEO Narcissism. We employed the measure of narcissism developed by Chatterjee and 
Hambrick (2011). The first indicator was the prominence of the CEO’s photograph in annual 
reports. For this variable, we coded it as one point if the annual report included no photo of 
the CEO, or if there was no annual report in the measurement year; two points if the CEO 
was photographed with other executives; three points if the CEO was photographed alone and 
the photo occupied less than a half page; and four points if the CEO was photographed alone 
and the photo occupied more than half a page. We obtained annual reports from company 
websites and the EDGAR database. The second indicator was CEO prominence in company 
press releases. This variable represented the number of times the CEO’s name appeared on 
the press releases divided by the total number of the press releases. We obtained the press 
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releases from Factiva. The third indicator was the relative cash pay measure. This variable 
divided CEO’s cash pay (salary and bonus) by the second-highest-paid executive in the 
company. The fourth indicator was the CEO’s non-cash pay divided by the 
second-highest-paid executive in the company. We obtained compensation data from 
Execucomp. The four indicators of narcissism were positively associated with each other and 
the correlation coefficients of the four indicators ranged in value from r = 0.10 to r = 0.15. We 
built the final narcissism index by calculating the sum of the standardized values (M = 0, SD 
= 1) across all four measures. 
Board Power. We used three indicators to measure board power (Hayward & Hambrick, 
1997; Tang et al., 2011): CEO non-duality, ratio of outside directors, and equity holding of 
outside directors. CEO non-duality was measured as a binary variable, which was coded as 1 
when the CEO did not occupy the chairperson position of the board, and as 0 otherwise. The 
ratio of outside directors was calculated as the number of outside (i.e., non-executive) 
directors who were appointed before the current CEO took office divided by the total number 
of directors (Wade et al., 1990; Zajac & Westphal, 1994). Equity holding of outside directors 
was measured as the ratio of the equity holding of outside directors to total company 
outstanding common shares. The data was obtained from Risk Metrics and company proxy 
statements. We built the final board power (BrdPwr) score by calculating the sum of the 
standardized values across all three measures. Board power should be treated as a formative 
construct (Tang et al., 2011). 
Strategic Change. Following previous research (e.g., Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990), we 
measured strategic change by tracing changes in a firm’s key resource allocation indicators: 
(1) advertising intensity (advertising/sales), (2) research and development intensity (R&D 
expense/sales), (3) nonproduction overhead (SGA expenses/sales), (4) plant and equipment 
newness (net plant and equipment/gross plant and equipment), (5) financial leverage 
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(debt/equity), (6) inventory levels (inventories/sales). The data were obtained from 
COMPUSTAT. 
To construct our measure of strategic change, we followed Weng and Lin (2012) to 
calculate the industry-adjusted strategic change (industry was defined based on 4-digit 
codes). We first calculated the changes in these ratios between the former and current year. 
For example, ? firm nonproduction overhead = a focal firm’s nonproduction overhead t+2 – 
nonproduction overhead t-1. We then considered the industry effect by subtracting the industry 
median changes in these ratios. For example, industry-adjusted nonproduction overhead = 
(industry median nonproduction overhead t+2 – industry median nonproduction overhead t-1). 
Thus, the industry-adjusted nonproduction overhead for each firm can be shown as (a focal 
firm’s nonproduction overhead t+2 – nonproduction overhead t-1) - (industry median 
nonproduction overhead t+2 – industry median nonproduction overhead t-1). We then 
calculated the absolute values of these variables and standardized the absolute values within 
the sample. Finally, we summed standardized indicators to create a single, composite measure 
of strategic change (StrCha).   
Firm Performance. We used two measures of firm performance: return on assets (ROA) and 
total stock returns (TSR). TSR and ROA have been widely used to measure firm performance 
(e.g., Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; Park et al., 2011; Peterson et al., 2012). ROA, a common 
accounting-based indicator for firm performance, is an indicator of how profitable a company 
is relative to its total assets, calculated as net income divided by total assets. TSR, a stock 
market measure, is calculated as changes in the stock price plus dividends paid, divided by 
the initial price of the stock. We obtained data on TSR and ROA from Execucomp. Again, 
industry effects were subtracted to obtain industry-adjusted performance indicators. 
Control Variables. Our statistical models used different dependent variables, which required 
adjusted sets of control variables (see Table 3.1 for an overview). For models with CEO 
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narcissism as dependent variable, we included the following controls at the CEO, board, firm 
and industry level. A prior CEO might exert important influence over the new CEO selection 
(Lorsch & Maclver, 1989; Zajac & Westphal, 1996). Therefore, we controlled for prior CEO 
gender, age, tenure, and ownership of stock. CEO gender was measured as a binary variable 
(1-male, 0-female); CEO age was measured in the year when data was collected; and CEO 
tenure was represented by the number of years the CEO had held the position. Further, we 
controlled for the possibility the new CEO was an outside hire (defined as having arrived at 
the firm within two years prior to becoming CEO). We obtained the CEO data from 
Execucomp and company proxy statements. We also controlled for board size (Zajac & 
Westphal, 1996), directors’ age and directors’ tenure in t-1, because these factors might affect 
the choice of a new CEO. Board size was defined as the total number of directors on the 
board (board size t-1). Directors’ age was measured as the average composite age of all 
directors on the board (director age t-1). Directors’ tenure was measured as the average 
number of years all directors held their positions (director tenure t-1). The data were obtained 
from proxy statements and Risk Metrics. We further controlled for previous firm performance 
(TSR t-2 and ROA t-2), because a firm’s prior financial performance affects the choice of new 
CEOs (Zajac & Westphal, 1996). We also controlled for firm size (measured as the number of 
employees) and firm age in t-1. Firm size influences the choice of CEO successors (Dalton & 
Kesner, 1983). Further, we controlled for 51 industry dummies based on two-digit SIC codes. 
We also included four-year dummies to control for time-specific factors.  
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Table 3.1 The List of Control Variables 
Dependent 
 variables 
CEO narcissism BrdPwrt+1 BrdPwrt+2 StrCha t+2 Firm 
Performancet+3 
 
 
 
 
 
Control  
variables 
Prior CEO gender CEO gender  CEO gender  CEO gender  CEO gender  
Prior CEO age CEO age  CEO age  CEO age  CEO age  
CEO Stock  
owned t-1 
CEO stock  
ownedt+1 
CEO stock  
ownedt+2 
CEO stock 
 ownedt+1 
CEO stock  
ownedt+1 
Prior CEO tenure CEO origin CEO origin CEO origin CEO origin 
CEO origin Board sizet+1 Board sizet+2 Board sizet+1 Board sizet+1 
Board sizet-1 Director  
tenuret+1 
Director 
tenuret+2 
Director 
tenuret+1 
Director  
tenuret+1 
Director tenuret-1 Director age t+1 Director aget+2 Director age t+1 Director aget+1 
Director age t-1 ROAt  ROAt+1 ROAt+1 ROAt+1 
ROAt-2 TSRt  TSRt+1 TSRt+1 TSRt+1 
TSRt-2 Firm sizet+1 Firm sizet+2 ResAvat+1 ResAvat+1 
Firm sizet-1 Firm age Firm age Firm sizet+1 Firm sizet+1 
Firm age BrdPwrt-1 BrdPwrt-1 Firm age Firm age 
Industry  
dummies 
Industry  
dummies 
Industry  
dummies 
Munificence Munificence 
Year dummies Year dummies Year dummies Dynamism Dynamism 
   Complexity Complexity 
   Industry  
dummies 
Industry 
dummies 
   Year dummies Year dummies 
For models with board power as the dependent variable, we controlled for the 
following factors. First, we controlled for several CEO characteristics, including CEO age, 
gender, and stock ownership (Shivdasani & Yermack, 1999). Since CEO origin might 
influence board composition, we controlled for the possibility the CEO was an outside hire. 
Second, we controlled for board size, directors’ age, and directors’ tenure, which might affect 
board power. We also controlled for previous board power before the current CEO was 
appointed. Third, we controlled for firm size, firm age, and previous firm performance, 
because these factors can affect board composition (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1988). Fourth, we 
included industry dummies and year dummies.  
For models with firm performance or the company’s engagement in strategic change 
as dependent variables, the following controls were included. First, CEO age, tenure 
(Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990), and gender might affect CEOs’ risk tendency and thus 
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strategic change. To control for CEOs’ structural power (Finkelstein, 1992), we included in 
the analyses the percentage of stocks owned by the CEO. Second, we controlled for board 
size, directors’ age, and directors’ tenure, which might affect strategic change (Tang et al., 
2011). We also controlled for the possibility the CEO was an outside hire, because whether a 
new CEO comes from inside or outside the firm might influence a company’s strategic 
choices. Third, we controlled for firm size, firm age, and prior firm performance. Firm size 
and firm age influence a company’s ability to acquire resources (Wales et al., 2013). Firm size 
has been argued to be directly related to issues of strategic change (Mintzberg, 1978). 
Additionally, previous firm performance has been shown to affect subsequent performance 
(Chen et al., 2009), and poorly performing firms are likely to initiate changes (Weng and Lin, 
2012). To control for immediate resource availability, we controlled for the ratio of current 
assets to current liabilities (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007). Fourth, we controlled for three 
environmental-level measures, namely environmental dynamism, environmental 
munificence, and environmental complexity. These variables are based on earlier measures 
used by Keats and Hitt (1988), and Heeley, King and Covin (2006). In brief, environmental 
munificence was computed as the average of the regression coefficient of an industry’s 
(four-digit SIC code) net sales and operationg income over a five-year period (from t-2 to 
t+2). Environmental dynamism was computed as the average of standard errors of an 
industry’s net sales and operationg income over a five-year period (from t-2 to t+2). 
Environmental complexity was measures by regressing the market shares of firms in a given 
industry in year t+2 on the market shares of these firms in year t-2. In line with Heeley et al. 
(2006), we multiplied the regression coefficient by negative one so that higher numbers 
indicate more complex environments. The data were obtained from COMPUSTAT. Finally, 
we controlled for industry dummies and year dummies. As we argued with a time-lag for the 
effect of CEO narcissism and board power on company strategy and firm performance (Tang 
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et al., 2011), we used data of CEO narcissism, board power, and control variables at year t+1 
to predict firm strategy at year t + 2 and firm performance at year t + 3. 
Endogeneity. Following Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007, 2011), we considered endogeneity 
in the statistical analyses. We first controlled for antecedent variables (measured in t-1) 
against the measure of CEO narcissism. The antecedent variables included firm age, firm 
revenues, ROE, and calendar-year dummies that might influence narcissistic tendencies. 
Second, we included ROA and TSR changes between t and t+1, because early performance 
improvements might stimulate narcissistic tendencies (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007). Third, 
we included CEO age, CEO stock owned, and whether the CEO was an outside hire as the 
contemporaneous variable measured in t+1. Among these variables, only the one-year 
dummy was significantly associated with CEO narcissism.  
3.3.3 Results 
We conducted multiple regression analyses to test the hypothesized relationships. We 
assessed multicollinearity problems by analyzing the variance inflation factor (VIF). The 
results confirmed that multicollinearity was not a critical problem in our models because all 
VIFs were below two. 
The descriptive statistics and correlations are presented in Table 3.2. As anticipated, 
board power t-1 was negatively associated with CEO narcissism t+1 (r = -0.19, p < .01). CEO 
narcissism t+1 was negatively associated with board power in t+1 (r = -0.22, p < .001) and 
board power in t+2 (r = -0.26, p < .001). Furthermore, CEO narcissism t+1 was positively 
associated with strategic change t+2 (r = 0.19, p < .01).  
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Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (N=254) 
Variables Mean St.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19  
1. Narcissimt+1 0.00 2.36                     
2. BrdPwrt-1 0.00 1.99 -.19                    
3. BrdPwrt+1 0.00 1.86 -.22 .34                   
4. BrdPwrt+2 0.00 1.83 -.26 .30 .85                  
5. StrCha 0.00 3.05 .19 .05 .00 -.04                 
6. ROAt-2 4.84 8.52 -.19 -.02 -.01 -.01 -.15                
7. ROAt 3.52 9.22 .09 -.15 -.01 .02 -.06 .37               
8. ROAt+1 4.36 7.82 .01 -.08 -.04 -.03 -.08 .30 .46              
9. ROAt+2 4.35 7.95 .05 -.13 -.11 -.07 -.15 .18 .38 .71             
10. ROAt+3 0.61 6.28 -.05 -.06 -.01 .01 -.17 .30 .27 .33 .43            
11. TSRt-2 2.84 63.31 -.11 .11 .10 .12 -.04 .24 .15 .17 .10 .13           
12. TSRt 8.11 57.40 -.02 -.04 -.11 -.06 -.03 -.04 .05 .18 .10 .00 -.08          
13. TSRt+1 12.22 54.87 -.05 -.04 -.04 -.05 .05 -.01 -.12 .15 .23 -.02 .05 -.10         
14. TSRt+2 19.91 50.09 .03 .00 .11 .09 -.02 -.06 -.04 -.15 .13 .23 -.14 -.16 -.18        
15. TSRt+3 2.81 43.80 .15 .01 -.14 -.14 .04 -.16 -.10 -.09 -.01 .07 -.03 -.07 .01 .06       
16. Director tenuret-1 8.63 6.69 .10 .02 -.08 -.05 .04 -.03 -.06 -.07 .00 .13 .02 .07 -.11 .03 .02      
17. Director tenuret+1 7.78 3.26 -.17 .09 .16 .20 -.05 .01 .01 -.05 .00 .01 .19 .14 -.09 -.01 -.09 .41     
18. Director tenuret+2 7.99 3.16 -.18 .03 .17 .26 -.13 .02 .10 -.02 .01 .00 .23 .04 -.08 .01 -.12 .40 .90    
19. Director aget-1 60.33 5.01 .03 .00 -.03 -.05 -.06 -.04 .10 -.03 -.03 -.18 -.01 .01 -.15 -.05 -.08 -.15 .30 .26   
20. Director aget+1 62.70 36.03 .01 -.06 -.19 .00 -.03 -.03 -.02 -.03 -.03 -.01 -.05 .00 -.04 .00 .01 .02 .07 .07 .06  
21. Director aget+2 61.01 3.39 -.10 .08 .05 .03 -.12 -.06 -.05 -.07 -.08 -.03 .00 .02 -.16 -.02 -.09 .23 .46 .45 .55  
22. Board sizet-1 9.94 2.70 -.01 .11 .06 .08 -.15 -.11 -.08 -.09 -.13 -.06 -.02 -.15 -.12 -.11 -.01 -.07 .01 .01 .19  
23. Board sizet-2 9.78 2.38 -.02 .05 .07 .08 -.20 -.06 -.04 -.03 -.05 -.02 .01 -.18 -.07 -.09 .00 -.04 -.02 .01 .15  
24. Board sizet-3 9.77 2.20 .03 .05 .07 .06 -.14 -.06 -.03 -.06 -.08 -.03 -.03 -.19 -.10 -.09 -.04 -.08 -.06 -.07 .19  
25. Prior CEO gender  0.98 0.14 .06 -.10 -.05 -.01 -.02 -.02 .00 .00 .02 -.02 .06 -.07 -.06 .09 .05 .04 .02 .03 .10  
26. New CEO gender 0.97 0.17 .05 .05 .06 .07 .06 -.05 -.04 -.02 -.02 -.01 -.02 .01 .06 .00 .06 .03 .06 .06 .00  
27. Prior CEO age 59.53 6.90 -.04 -.26 -.07 .01 -.13 -.02 .10 .08 .10 -.02 .02 -.01 -.14 -.05 -.04 .21 .38 .44 .42  
28. New CEO age  52.68 6.44 .04 .10 -.11 -.13 .01 -.14 -.15 -.16 -.11 -.08 -.03 .14 .02 -.07 .03 .24 .08 .03 .10  
29. Prior CEO tenuret-1 9.02 7.29 -.05 -.45 .00 .03 -.09 .06 .19 .07 .15 .14 -.01 .03 -.06 .02 -.04 .24 .40 .43 .15  
30. Stock ownedt-1 2.78 5.83 .01 -.26 -.10 -.05 .00 .20 .17 .12 .18 .10 .03 -.08 .05 .07 -.01 .17 .29 .32 .04  
31. Stock ownedt+1 0.78 1.40 .06 .05 .02 -.01 .25 -.13 -.08 -.05 -.06 -.16 -.02 .14 .09 .00 .02 .16 .13 .14 -.16  
32. Stock ownedt+2 0.72 1.42 .02 .06 .05 .02 .30 -.16 -.12 -.04 -.07 -.26 -.03 .13 .09 -.08 -.05 .02 .11 .12 -.18  
33. New CEO origin 0.27 0.45 .09 .02 -.01 -.05 .16 .00 -.03 .02 .05 -.04 -.03 .01 .07 .10 .06 -.09 -.12 -.17 -.07  
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34. Firm sizet-1 27.35 138.37 -.03 .07 .27 .35 -.10 .04 .04 .03 .03 .00 .04 -.01 -.03 -.01 .01 -.05 -.05 -.03 -.02  
35. Firm sizet+1 26.80 138.10 -.03 .07 .28 .36 -.10 .04 .04 .04 .04 .01 .04 .00 -.03 -.01 .01 -.06 -.05 -.03 -.02  
36. Firm sizet+2 27.06 143.67 -.03 .08 .28 .36 -.10 .04 .04 .04 .04 .01 .04 .00 -.03 -.01 .01 -.05 -.05 -.03 -.03  
37. Firm age 63.69 50.58 -.02 .05 -.08 -.02 -.03 .06 .03 .00 .03 -.04 .01 .00 -.08 -.01 -.02 .00 .00 -.01 .03  
38. ResAvat+2 2.08 1.30 .02 -.11 .00 .02 .16 -.06 .06 .10 .17 .04 -.04 .09 .07 .11 -.07 -.11 -.03 .00 -.01  
39. Munificence 0.24 0.59 .02 -.03 -.01 .00 .04 .13 .17 .34 .22 .10 .04 .11 .16 -.12 .07 .02 -.05 -.05 -.05  
40. Dynamism 1.00 2.37 .02 -.05 -.07 -.07 -.02 -.05 -.06 -.01 -.03 -.06 -.10 .03 -.05 -.01 .00 .06 .04 .01 .06  
41. Complexity -0.83 1.08 .00 -.10 .03 .01 .07 .06 -.02 -.27 -.31 .05 -.06 -.02 -.08 -.07 -.40 -.01 -.01 -.01 .00  
Variable 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40  
21. Director aget+2 .10                      
22. Board sizet-1 .09 .19                     
23. Board sizet-2 .08 .13 .85                    
24. Board sizet-3 .09 .20 .82 .90                   
25. Prior CEO gender  .01 .00 .01 .05 -.05                  
26. New CEO gender .02 .04 -.02 -.05 -.03 .14                 
27. Prior CEO age .07 .39 .05 .09 .08 .15 .08                
28. New CEO age  .04 .30 .15 .11 .15 -.01 -.01 .05               
29. Prior CEO tenuret-1 -.03 .07 -.21 -.18 -.18 .07 .05 .47 -.18              
30. Stock ownedt-1 -.02 .06 -.24 -.21 -.24 .05 .05 .26 -.19 .45             
31. Stock ownedt+1 -.05 -.15 -.21 -.29 -.31 -.17 .03 -.05 .03 .03 .23            
32. Stock ownedt+2 -.05 -.17 -.22 -.30 -.31 -.17 .05 -.04 .00 .01 .16 .92           
33. New CEO origin -.06 -.18 -.09 -.09 -.12 .01 .05 -.05 -.02 -.03 -.03 -.14 -.11          
34. Firm sizet-1 .00 -.01 .22 .22 .25 .01 .02 .00 .07 -.03 -.07 -.07 -.07 -.08         
35. Firm sizet+1 .00 -.02 .21 .22 .24 -.01 .00 .00 .06 -.03 -.06 -.07 -.06 -.08 >.99        
36. Firm sizet+2 .00 -.02 .20 .21 .23 -.01 .00 .00 .06 -.03 -.06 -.06 -.06 -.08 1.00 >.99       
37. Firm age .20 .06 .28 .30 .28 .04 -.06 .05 .19 -.15 -.18 -.18 -.15 -.02 .14 .15 .14      
38. ResAvat+2 -.03 -.07 -.38 -.36 -.37 .03 -.03 .07 -.08 .12 .05 .08 .14 .17 -.11 -.10 -.10 -.19     
39. Munificence .02 .02 -.17 -.14 -.13 -.01 -.02 -.04 -.08 .00 .01 .04 .02 -.07 .07 .09 .09 -.10 -.02    
40. Dynamism .13 .14 .23 .20 .20 -.03 .06 .10 .10 .07 .04 -.09 -.07 -.02 .00 .00 .00 .10 -.13 -.06   
41. Complexity -.01 -.03 .00 -.06 .04 .02 .01 .01 .07 .05 .02 .02 .01 -.06 -.02 -.02 -.02 -.09 -.01 -.18 -.02  
Note: Coefficients greater than 0.12 in absolute value are significant at p < .05; Industry dummies and year dummies are not shown in this table.
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Table 3.3 provides the results of a multiple regression analysis of CEO narcissism t+1 
on board power t-1. We applied two models to test Hypothesis 1. In Model 1, we regressed 
CEO narcissism t+1 on all of the control variables. Model 2 reports the results from the full 
model, including all of the control variables and board power t-1. In Model 2, the 
standardized coefficient is -0.31 (p < .001) for board power t-1. This supports Hypothesis 1. 
That is, board power in t-1 is negatively associated with the selection of a narcissistic CEO in 
t+1. Hypothesis 2 suggests that CEO narcissism is negatively related to board power 
following the CEO’s appointment. This hypothesis was tested with a regression analysis of 
board power t+1, and board power t+2 on CEO narcissism t+1 separately. The results in Table 
3.4 indicate that CEO narcissism t+1 has a negative impact on board power t+1 (β = -0.12, p 
< .10) and board power t+2 (β = -0.15, p < .05). Thus, Hypothesis 2 is supported. In 
Hypothesis 3, we suggested that strategic change is more likely for high-level narcissistic 
CEOs. We obtained a positive and significant coefficient for CEO narcissism (β = 0.18, p < 
.05) (see Model 2 in Table 3.5), which supports Hypothesis 3. Table 3.5 also reports the effect 
of board power on the relationship of CEO narcissism and strategic change. The coefficient 
of the interaction term in Model 5 is not significant. Thus, Hypothesis 4 is not supported. 
Table 3.5 also shows that CEO stock owned and whether a new CEO comes from inside or 
outside the firm could significantly influence a company’s strategic choices. Hypothesis 5 
posited that CEO narcissism moderates the effect of strategic change on firm performance. 
We applied an SPSS macro to assess the moderated mediation effect of CEO narcissism on 
firm performance (For details see Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007). The results in table 3.6 
show that only the coefficients of ROA are marginally significant (β = -0.11, p < .10). Thus, 
Hypothesis 5 is only partially supported. 
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Table 3.3 The Effect of Board Power t-1 on CEO Narcissism t+1 
Variables       Model 1 
        SC 
       Model 2 
        SC 
Prior CEO gender  .03 .00 
Prior CEO age  -.26*** -.32*** 
Prior CEO tenure -.08 -.23* 
CEO Stock ownedt-1 .06 .03 
New CEO origin .10 .10 
Board sizet-1 -.02 -.04 
Director tenuret-1 .23** .29*** 
Director age t-1 .16+ .23** 
ROAt-2 -.19* -.20** 
TSRt-2 .02 .02 
Firm sizet-1 .00 .02 
Firm age -.07 -.07 
BrdPwrt-1  -.31*** 
F 1.44* 1.79*** 
Adjusted R2 .10 .17 
Note: a Standardized coefficients are reported. 
       b All VIFs are below 2. 
       c Industry dummies and year dummies are not shown in this table. 
     d i=1,2 
+ p< .1; * p< .05;** p< .01;*** p< .001. 
 
Table 3.4 The Effect of CEO Narcissism t+1 on Board Power t+1, Board Power t+2 
Variables Model 1 
SC(BrdPwr t+1) 
Model 2 
SC(BrdPwr t+1) 
Model 3 
SC(BrdPwr t+2) 
Model 4 
SC(BrdPwrt+2) 
CEO gender  .02 .02 .03 .02 
CEO age  -.16* -.15** -.19** -.18** 
CEO stock ownedt+i .04 .05 .03 .04 
New CEO origin .01 .02 .00 .01 
Board sizet+i .08 .08 .06 .07 
Director tenuret+i .14* .11 .25*** .22** 
Director age t+i -.16**  -.16** -.03 -.04 
ROAt / ROAt+1 .06 .06 -.04 -.05 
TSRt / TSRt+1 -.13+ -.13+ -.02 -.02 
Firm sizet+i .23** .22** .31*** .30*** 
Firm age -.06 -.06 -.03 -.04 
BrdPwrt-1 .35*** .33*** .27*** .25*** 
Narcissismt+1  -.12+  -.15* 
F 2.37*** 2.42*** 2.75*** 2.86***
Adjusted R2 .26 .27 .31 .33 
Note: a Standardized coefficients are reported. 
       b All VIFs are below 2. 
       c Industry dummies and year dummies are not shown in this table. 
     d i=1,2 
+ p< .1; * p< .05;** p< .01;*** p< .001. 
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Table 3.5 The Effect of CEO Narcissism t+1 on Strategic Change t+2 
Variables Model 1 
SC 
Model 2 
SC 
Model 3 
SC 
Model 4 
SC 
CEO gender  .02 .02 .02 .02 
CEO age  -.02 -.04 -.03 -.03 
CEO stock ownedt+1 .37*** .36*** .36*** .36*** 
New CEO origin .21** .19** .19** .19** 
Board sizet+1 -.16* -.16* -.17* -.17* 
Director tenuret+1 -.04 .00 -.01 -.01 
Director age t+1 -.05 -.05 -.04 -.04 
ROAt+1 -.08 -.08 -.08 -.08 
TSRt+1 .03 .03 .03 .03 
ResAvat+1 .09 .08 .08 .08 
Firm sizet+1 .09 .10 .07 .07 
Firm age .09 .10 .10 .11 
Munificence -.02 -.01 -.01 .00 
Dynamism .06 .05 .05 .06 
Complexity .16 .14 .13 .14 
Narcissismt+1  .18* .20** .18* 
BrdPwrt+1   .09 .09 
Narcissismt+1*BrdPwrt+1    -.04 
F 1.67** 1.80*** 1.80*** 1.77**
Adjusted R2 .15 .18 .18 .18 
Note: a Standardized coefficients are reported.  
       b All VIFs are below 2. 
       c Industry dummies and year dummies are not shown in this table. 
    + p< .1; * p< .05;** p< .01;*** p< .001. 
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Table 3.6 The Moderated Mediation Effect of CEO Narcissism t+1 on Firm Performance t+3 
Variables Model 1 
ROA
    Model 2 
    TSR
CEO gender .86 
(2.44) 
14.44 
(16.31) 
CEO age .01 
(.07) 
.11 
(.46) 
CEO stock ownedt+1 -.80+
(.42) 
-.65 
(2.81) 
New CEO origin -1.42 
(1.04) 
-1.81 
(6.96) 
Board sizet+1 -.36+ 
(.21) 
.34 
(1.41) 
Director tenuret+1 -.02 
(.15) 
-.66 
(.96) 
Director age t+1 -.01 
(.01) 
.02 
(.07) 
ROAt+1 .31***
(.06) 
-.1.27** 
(.44) 
TSRt+1 .00 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.06) 
ResAvat+1 .35 
(.44) 
-.24 
(2.91) 
Firm sizet+1 .00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.03) 
Firm age -.00 
(.01) 
-.11+ 
(.06) 
Munificence .03 
(.93) 
-1.55 
(6.22) 
Dynamism -.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
Complexity -.44 
(.63) 
-6.82 
(4.17) 
Narcissismt+1 -.06 
(.19) 
.89 
(1.29) 
StrChat+2 -.05 
(.17) 
.19 
(1.14) 
StrChat+2*Narcissismt+1 -.11+  
(.06) 
.17 
(.37) 
                  Note: a Standardized coefficients are reported; values in parentheses are standard errors. 
                     b All VIFs are below 2. 
                     c Industry dummies and year dummies are not shown in this table. 
             + p< .1; * p< .05;** p< .01;*** p< .001 
3.4 Discussion 
This study attempts to discern the interrelation between board power and CEO narcissism, as 
well as their effects on strategic change and firm performance. From a longitudinal analysis 
of S&P 1500 companies, we found general support for our hypotheses. Specifically, our 
results suggest that board power is negatively associated with the selection of a narcissistic 
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CEO, and CEO narcissism in turn has a negative influence on board power. We further found 
that CEO narcissism has a positive effect on strategic change. The results provide some 
support for a moderated mediation effect of CEO narcissism on firm performance. 
3.4.1 The Interrelations between Board Power and CEO Narcissism 
Our study makes several significant contributions to governance research on CEO selection 
and behavior. We draw on agency theory, power institutionalization, and power circulation 
theory to develop a research framework that, in a first step, links board power to CEO 
selection. Although a large stream of research focused on the relationship between boards and 
CEO selection (e.g., Borokhovich et al., 1996; Haleblian, & Rajagopalan, 2012; Lorsch & 
MacIver, 1989; Parrino, 1997; Tian, Zajac & Westphal, 1996), little systematic research has 
examined whether a powerful board will hire a narcissistic CEO. We find this link and 
highlight the importance of integrating personality theories with research on CEO selection in 
corporate governance research.  
The study results also contribute to the growing literature on leaders’ narcissism, a 
topic that has received growing attention in the upper echelon literature. Existing research on 
narcissism has primarily focused on exploring the positive or negative implications of 
narcissism in terms of leadership and individual performance (e.g., Judge et al., 2006; Kets 
De Vries & Miller, 1985; Maccoby, 2000). CEO narcissism as one of the most important 
personality dimensions has also been identified as a substantial influence on interpersonal 
relationships (Campbell, Foster, & Finkel, 2002; Campbell & Miller, 2011). Although some 
research has focused on the relationship between CEO narcissism and new-director selection, 
arguing that CEO narcissism is important to understanding the CEO-board relationship (e.g., 
Zhu & Chen, 2014 b), few empirical studies have examined how CEO narcissism influences 
board power. Thus, we also consider the reciprocal effect, i.e. how CEO narcissism 
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influences board power. Findings suggest that narcissistic CEOs tend to reduce board power 
over time, which generates a vicious circle as weak boards tend to select narcissistic leaders, 
which, in turn, try to reduce board power. This study is the first to explore CEO-board 
relation by exploring the role of narcissism in the reciprocal relationship between board’s 
CEO selection and CEO’s influence on board power. 
3.4.2 The Relationship among CEO Narcissism, Board Power, and Strategic Change 
Our study also has important implications for the strategic leadership literature. Previous 
studies revealed the importance of CEO personality and behavior for strategic 
decision-making and firm outcomes (Campbell et al., 2011; Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; 
Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Simsek, Heavey, & Veiga, 2010; Tang et al., 2011). We base our 
arguments on power institutionalization theory and power circulation theory. Highly 
narcissistic CEOs tend to initiate strategic change because it allows them to expand their 
resources, thereby perpetuating their power, and to become the center of attention, which is 
an important motive for narcissistic individuals.  
This study also has some implications for strategic management research by 
considering whether board power plays a role in the effect of CEO narcissism on strategic 
decisions. Although previous empirical studies have illustrated that a powerful board can 
limit a CEO’s leeway in decision-making (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; Tang et al., 2011), 
this study is the first to explore the role of board power in the relationship to CEO narcissism 
and strategic change. However, we found no support for this relationship in the data. This 
might because narcissism as a personality trait is a complex construct that combines a strong 
desire for attention, superiority, and affirmation (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007). In order to 
demonstrate their authority and superiority, narcissistic leaders tend to resist other’s 
suggestions (Hogan et al., 1990) and tend to be dominant when make company strategy 
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decisions (Campbell & Miller, 2011). 
3.4.3 The Moderated Mediation Effect of CEO Narcissism on Firm Performance. 
Another important contribution of this study is the recognition and exploration of the effect of 
CEO narcissism on firm performance. Although a growing body of literature focuses on the 
effects of CEO narcissism on firm strategy and performance (e.g., Chatterjee & Hambrick, 
2007, 2011; Judge et al., 2006), little has been done to understand how CEO narcissism 
influences strategic change and firm performance. The results support the proposition that 
narcissistic CEOs are more likely to initiate and implement strategic change, and somewhat 
support the proposition that CEO narcissistic tendencies moderate the effect of such changes 
on firm performance. Existing research paints a complex and inconsistent picture of how 
strategic change impacts firm performance. Our work complements this research, but more 
studies are necessary to improve our understanding of these relationships. 
3.4.4 Practical Implications 
Our findings also have important implications for practitioners. First, the present study 
provides some recommendations for CEO selection. It is important that a board understand a 
potential candidates’ narcissistic traits (Engelen et al., 2013). Narcissistic CEOs are more 
likely to initiate power struggles with the board of directors and tend to constrain the board’s 
influence on strategic decision-making as they have stronger power motivation. Further, 
highly narcissistic CEOs have a strong desire for superiority, applause, and affirmation, 
which is why they are more likely to change company strategy, but might have little concern 
about the possibility of significant losses. In other words, having a narcissistic CEO is risky 
and might dampen firm effectiveness (Engelen et al., 2013). A suggestion based on our main 
findings is that boards consider new prospective CEOs’ narcissistic tendencies because highly 
narcissistic CEOs might negatively affect a company’s performance.  
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Our results also suggest that boards of directors play an important role when a firm 
selects a new CEO, and further show that board power is negatively associated with the 
selection of a narcissistic CEO. Although having a high narcissistic CEO is risky, a powerful 
board might reduce the effects of a highly narcissistic CEO. A powerful board could be more 
effective in aligning the interests of owners and managers. Thus, keeping a powerful board in 
the company might provide the necessary monitoring skills and resources for company 
management. Further, a powerful board is more likely to be involved in corporate strategy, 
and previous studies have found that there is a positive relationship between the board’s 
involvement in strategic decision-making and corporate performance (Pearce & Zahra, 1991).  
Therefore, a company should try to create a high-powered board especially when there is a 
high-powered CEO, so that the board can effectively monitor management on behalf of 
shareholders. 
3.4.5 Limitations and Further Research 
Like any study, our study has several limitations. The first limitation is that the measures of 
CEO narcissism in our study rely on unobtrusive indicators. Although these indicators have 
been validated in other studies, the measure is, nevertheless, imperfect. Therefore, our 
measures for narcissism might need additional validation and refinement in future research.  
Second, we only examined United States companies, in which CEOs generally have 
greater discretion, based on the country’s culture, corporate governance, and economic 
system (Crossland & Hambrick, 2007; Hofstede, 2001). Thus, our conclusions might not 
necessarily apply to other samples outside the United States. Further research might thus test 
our research framework in different cultural contexts. 
The third limitation concerns our focus CEO narcissism, as we did not examine the 
influence of other personality dimensions. Although narcissism is currently one of the most 
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discussed and controversial personality dimensions of CEOs (Zhu & Chen, 2014a), future 
research should consider other personality dimensions, especially those that can influence 
CEOs’ relationships with boards of directors and strategic decisions. 
Fourth, we only studied the relationship between board power and narcissism of the 
selected CEO. Studying whether powerful boards are more likely to opt for CEOs that are 
similar to themselves might be important as well. For example, a powerful board might hire a 
new CEO who is more (or less) similar to the board members in terms of a narcissistic 
personality. Zajac and Westphal (1996) found that powerful boards favored a new CEO who 
has a specific demographic profile. It would thus be interesting to study the relationship 
between board members’ narcissistic tendencies and the new CEO’s narcissistic tendencies. 
Another extension of the current study is the inclusion of TMTs. Carmeli and Schaubroek 
(2006) pointed out that TMT behavioral integration could affect the quality of strategic 
decisions. Kor (2006) discussed the interaction effects of top management teams and board 
outsider composition on R&D intensity. Future research could thus examine TMT personality 
and its impact on a company’s strategic decision-making processes. 
Lastly, results from regression analyses provided consistent support for most, but not 
all, of our hypotheses. We did not obtain significant results for tests on the role of board 
power in the relationship between CEO narcissism and strategic change. Future research 
could examine processes by which a narcissistic CEO restrains boards of directors’ influence 
on company strategy, and whether this creates tension between the board and CEO. Since a 
narcissistic CEO is likely to dominate the interaction with the board of directors and resist 
others’ suggestions (Campbell & Miller, 2011), this might ultimately result in the dismissal of 
the CEO. 
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3.5 Conclusion 
Our results highlight the importance of CEO personality in the dynamic relationship between 
a board’s CEO selection and a CEO’s influence on board power. Ocasio (1994) identified a 
power struggle between the CEO and the board of directors because both parties tend to 
consolidate and attempt to increase their power over time. Our findings offer progress 
towards understanding this power struggle by exploring the role of CEO narcissism. In our 
sample, powerful boards tend not to hire narcissistic CEOs. In turn, CEO narcissism has a 
negative impact on board power. In addition, our study reveals the important influence of 
CEO personality characteristics on company strategy and firm performance, which reaffirms 
Chatterjee and Hambrick’s (2007) finding that narcissistic CEOs tend to undertake relatively 
bold, risky actions. Our study of CEO-board relations and their impact on company strategy 
has important implications for strategic management research. As Tang et al. (2011) pointed 
out, the power balance should be considered in a broad context and include CEOs, boards of 
directors and top managers.  
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CHAPTER 4 
4 The Effects of CEO Narcissism on Risk Taking and Director 
Selection: Evidence from an Online Experiment 
4.1 Introduction 
Chief executive officers’ (CEOs) personality characteristics play an important role in their 
decision making processes (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011). Existing research based on upper 
echelon theory (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) has attempted to explain how CEO personality 
characteristics, including locus of control (Miller & Toulouse, 1986), dominance (Tang, 
Crossan, & Rowe, 2011), and narcissism (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007, 2011), affect their 
decision making. Narcissism, defined as the degree to which an individual has an inflated 
self-view and strives to have their inflated self-view continuously reinforced (Campbell & 
Miller, 2011; Judge, LePine, & Rich, 2006) can be expected to play a prominent role in a 
CEO’s decisions. Consequently, researchers in strategic management and organizational 
theory have been investigating how narcissism influences CEOs’ decisions and leadership 
behaviors (e.g., Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007, 2011; Gerstner, Konig, Enders, & Hambrick, 
2013; Resick, Whitman, Weingarden, & Hiller, 2009; Zhu & Chen, 2014a, b). A major strand 
of these studies has particularly focused on the link between CEO narcissism and company 
strategic decisions (e.g., Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007, 2011; Gerstner et al., 2013; Zhu & 
Chen, 2014a). Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007), for example, suggested that narcissistic 
CEOs favor a dynamic and grandiose strategy, and Gerstner et al. (2013) found narcissistic 
CEOs are relatively aggressive toward technological discontinuities. Furthermore, Zhu and 
Chen (2014a) examined the effect of CEO narcissism on company strategy by exploring the 
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CEO-board relationship. They pointed out that narcissistic CEOs tend to reduce the 
effectiveness of boards’ major functions, and further demonstrated that, when deciding 
corporate strategies, narcissistic CEOs tend to rely more on their own prior experiences and 
less on the directors’ prior experiences. Zhu and Chen (2014b) also stated that a CEO is more 
likely to select a new director who is similar in narcissistic tendency or who has worked with 
other similarly narcissistic CEOs before. Therefore, narcissistic CEOs’ decision making is not 
only reflected in their influence on company strategic decisions, but also in the CEO-board 
relationship. With our study, we intend to further explore the role of narcissism in CEOs’ 
strategic decisions and CEO-board relations by examining the effects of CEO narcissism on 
risk taking and the power of new directors. Furthermore, we also aim to analyze how past 
firm performance influences narcissistic CEOs’ decision making. We chose an experimental 
setting for our analyses as most empirical studies on CEO narcissism used unobtrusive 
measures that are only partial and indirect proxies for narcissistic tendencies (Chatterjee & 
Hambrick, 2007). However, researchers have pointed out that unobtrusive measures of 
narcissism are imprecise and suggested that future work on CEO narcissism should measure 
narcissism using the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI) (e.g., Chatterjee & Hambrick, 
2011; Zhu & Chen, 2014b). Complementary to previous work, we applied NPI in a controlled 
experimental setting with participants from various occupations (i.e., not restricted to CEOs). 
We chose this format because it is difficult to have direct access to top executives in large 
companies, and top executives are reluctant to release company’s strategic data or answer 
questions about their psychological traits (Carpenter, Geletkanycz, & Sanders, 2004; Cycyota 
& Harrison, 2006). Furthermore, Boone, Olffen, and Witteloostuijn (1998) pointed out 
experimental research in a relatively controlled laboratory setting is as important as field 
research and is always a fair test of theory. Therefore, the controlled experiment setting in our 
research is necessary and important to understand narcissistic CEOs’ decision making 
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processes. 
Risk taking is fundamental to decision making and has important implications for firm 
survival and development (Li & Tang, 2010; Sanders & Hambrick, 2007;). Research on 
individual decision making at non-CEO levels have linked narcissism, typically measured by 
the NPI (Emmons, 1984), to risky activities such as bets (Campbell et al., 2004), gambling 
(Lakey, Rose, Campbell, & Goodie, 2008), sensation seeking (Emmons, 1981), and 
impulsivity (Foster & Trimm, 2008). Therefore, as an extension to previous research, we 
measured risk attitude in two ways: by self-assessment on a given scale (Dohmen et al., 
2005) and hypothetical lottery questions (Eckel & Grossman, 2002). We chose these two 
measurements in the individual decision making setting because of their wide use in previous 
research. In the executive setting, empirical research has found that CEO narcissism was 
positively associated with the number and size of acquisitions (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007) 
and with risk-taking spending (e.g., research and development, capital expenditures) (Zhu & 
Chen, 2014b). In contrast, Chatterjee and Hambrick (2011) did not find a significant effect of 
CEO narcissism on acquisition premiums or on overall risky outlays. Following the call by 
Chatterjee and Hambrick (2011), we tried to elaborate on this inconsistent evidence. In our 
experiment, we firstly examined the relationship between narcissism and risk taking. 
Secondly, each participant had to take over the role of CEO in a large company, which 
allowed us to examine the impact of narcissism on risk taking in a business setting.  
Furthermore, as aforementioned, narcissistic CEOs’ decision making could also be 
reflected in how narcissistic CEOs arrange their relationship with the board of directors, 
mainly because CEOs play an important role in the director selection process (Lorsch & 
MacIver, 1989). Existing research has shown that in order to reduce the uncertainty that new 
directors may not support the CEO’s leadership style and firm decisions, CEOs tend to select 
new directors with whom they have personal relationships (Fredrickson, Hambrick, & 
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Baumrin, 1988; Mace, 1971), who are demographically similar to themselves (Westphal & 
Zajac, 1995), or who have similar narcissistic tendencies or prior experience with narcissistic 
CEOs (Zhu & Chen, 2014b). However, little theoretical or empirical research has specifically 
examined the role of CEO narcissism in the director selection process. Zhu and Chen (2014b) 
stated that CEOs are usually concerned with uncertainty when selecting a new director, and 
Blair, Hoffman, and Helland (2008) show that a narcissistic CEO who tends to be arrogant 
and power-oriented is more likely to be concerned that the new directors may not support 
their leadership and will impair their power. Power is the capability of individuals to exert 
their will and to achieve their desired goals. In corporate governance, power reflects the 
capacity of CEOs or directors to achieve a desired objective or result through both formal and 
informal means (Pfeffer, 1980). Powerful new directors have the potential to increase board 
power and impose constrains on CEOs’ strategy decisions. Therefore, we argue that, in order 
to reduce the uncertainty, a narcissistic CEO will not select high power candidates.  
Based on upper echelons theory, existing research indicates that CEO personality 
plays an important role in their decision making process and that its impact on firm decisions 
is moderated by environmental, organizational, and individual-level determinants of 
managerial discretion (Crossland & Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). 
However, there is a lack of research on factors that might moderate the relationship between 
CEO narcissism and CEO behaviors (e.g., risk taking and director selection). Since narcissists 
maintain an inflated sense of themselves, they tend to make decisions that are not in the best 
interests of their company (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; Zhu & Chen, 2014a). To mitigate 
these negative effects, it is important to examine external factors that either strengthen or 
weaken the impact of CEO narcissism on firm risk taking or the power of new directors. 
Previous research contributed to a better understanding of the effect that narcissistic CEOs’ 
decisions have on firm performance (e.g., Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; Resick et al., 2009). 
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For example, Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) showed that CEO narcissism tends to generate 
more variability and irregular company performance. Resick et al. (2009) showed that CEO 
narcissism is not related to team performance. However, different from previous studies, we 
aim to explore whether a firm’s financial performance also influences narcissistic CEOs’ 
decision-making. Firms’ financial performance provides a strong cue about a CEO’s 
leadership ability and reflects a company’s overall capability (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011), 
thus influencing how much discretion a CEO would possess, which will affect a narcissistic 
CEO’s decision making process.   
Overall, this study makes several important contributions to existing management 
literature. First, based on personality theories and upper echelons theory, our study aims to 
uncover the role of narcissism in CEOs’ decision-making, which incorporates both the 
predictive role of CEO narcissism on risk taking and the impact that narcissism has on the 
power of new directors. Second, our study strives to elaborate on the moderating role firm 
performance has in these relationships (see research framework in Figure 4.1). Third, 
considering the limitations of unobtrusive measures of narcissism and the difficulty in having 
direct access to CEOs within large companies, we developed an experimental setting to 
explore the aforementioned relationships. 
Figure 4.1 Overview of the Research Model 
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4.2 Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
CEO Narcissism. Campbell and Miller (2011) argued that narcissism consists of two parts. 
First, narcissists have an inflated sense of self-concept (Campbell, Rudich, & Sedikides, 
2002; Judge et al., 2006). Narcissists’ positive self-concept generally reflects feelings of 
inherent personal superiority (Emmons, 1987), uniqueness (Emmons, 1984), and entitlement 
(Campbell, Bonacci, Shelton, Exline, & Bushman, 2004), which captures the cognitive 
elements of narcissism. Second, the construct comprises motivational elements. That is, 
narcissistic individuals display a range of self-regulation efforts to continuously reinforce 
their positive self-views (Morf & Rhodewalt 2001). For example, narcissists strive to gain 
attention (Buss & Chiodo, 1991) and engage in various types of behaviors that invite 
applause and admiration (Morf & Rhodewalt 2001; Zhu & Chen, 2014b). Prior studies have 
consistently found that high narcissism is associated with arrogance, self-absorption, 
self-admiration, a sense of entitlement, and a sense of superiority (Ames, Rose, & Anderson, 
2006; Emmons, 1987; Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001; Resick et al., 2009). Furthermore, there is 
some empirical evidence that qualities of narcissistic individuals help them to be promoted to 
the CEO position to begin with (Rosenthal & Pittinsky, 2006). However, there is considerable 
variance in narcissistic tendencies across CEOs (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007, 2011) and 
highly narcissistic CEOs tend to manage firms very differently than their less narcissistic 
counterparts (Zhu & Chen, 2014a).   
4.2.1 The Relationship between CEO Narcissism and Risk Taking 
Narcissism affects how CEOs interpret situational stimuli, which then affects their strategic 
decision making (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011). Research on narcissism has stated that 
narcissistic CEOs tend to believe that they are extremely talented and have high intelligence, 
creation, and leadership abilities (Farwell & Wohlwend-Lloyd, 1998; Judge et al., 2006; 
Paulhus, 1998) and think they can learn more than others from the same opportunity (Paulhus, 
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1998). Moreover, Campbell et al. (2004) pointed out that narcissistic individuals usually make 
decisions based on the biased expectation that they would perform better than others, and the 
presumption that they will be successful on a given task. However, behavioral decision theory 
suggests that decision makers’ cognitive biases about their own abilities might encourage them 
to overestimate their problem solving capabilities, underestimate the resource requirements of 
risky initiatives, and underestimate the firm’s uncertainties (Li & Tang, 2010). Narcissistic 
CEOs’ cognitive biases about their abilities, brilliance, and competence might lead narcissistic 
CEOs to overestimate the amount and value of the information they have, underestimate the 
cost of a risky decision and, thus, have an overly optimistic attitude for risky actions. 
Therefore, these misperceptions might not only lead narcissistic CEOs to feel extraordinarily 
confident about their understanding of the opportunities and their judgment in a task domain, 
but may also lead them to interpret decision situations as less risky than they really are. 
Therefore, a highly narcissistic CEO is more likely to exhibit cognitive and decision making 
biases that increase their likelihood of taking bald and risky behaviors. 
To meet their continuous need for confirmation and admiration, narcissistic CEOs tend 
to engage in publicly visible activities (Morf & Rhodewalt 2001; Wallace & Baumeister, 
2002). Taking risky activities will help narcissistic CEOs to be the center of attention and 
create a sense of superiority, thus they are more likely to strive for bold, daring, and highly 
visible initiatives to draw attention to their vision and leadership and to have their inflated 
self-esteem reinforced. Furthermore, since company strategies involving innovation and 
pioneering can enhance their power and influence (Wales et al., 2013), a narcissistic CEO who 
is power-oriented is more likely to engage in high-risk projects. Research on narcissism have 
pointed out power as an important motivator for narcissistic leaders (Rosenthal & Pittinsky, 
2006) and narcissistic leaders have a strong desire to use this power to fulfill their needs and 
visions (Campbell, Hoffman, Campbell, & Marchisio, 2011). Therefore, motivated by their 
strong desire for power and influence, a narcissistic CEO is likely to take bald and risky 
actions.  
Hypothesis 1 (H1): CEO narcissism is positively associated with risk taking. 
4.2.2 The Relationship between CEO Narcissism and the Power of New Directors 
CEOs play a pivotal role in director recruitment and selection, in spite of official nominating 
committees (Foster, 1982; Lorsch & MacIver, 1989). Researchers have shown that CEOs tend 
to select directors who have similar values, attitudes, or personality (e.g., Westphal & Zajac, 
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1995; Zhu & Chen, 2014b), and as such new directors are more likely to support the CEO’s 
strategic decisions and realize their respective preferences with less communication effort 
(Zhu & Chen, 2014b). For the purpose of reducing uncertainty that the new director will not 
be supportive of their leadership and strategic decisions, a more narcissistic CEO is less likely 
to hire high-power directors who might increase board effectiveness in opposition of the 
CEO’s own goals. Furthermore, Wade, O'Reilly, and Chandratat (1990) pointed out CEOs can 
also enhance their influence over the board by appointing directors. In order to maintain and 
strengthen their control over the company, a more narcissistic CEO tends not to appoint a 
director who possesses high power.  
Research on CEO-board relationships has shown that there is a conflict between CEOs 
and directors, and the conflict generally focuses on boards’ advice and counsel functions and 
its monitoring function (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Previous studies also showed that board 
composition and board effectiveness (e.g., monitoring function) could be influenced by the 
appointment of new directors (Westphal & Zajac, 1995). The appointment of a new director 
with higher power might increase the power of the board, which will then increase the board’s 
influence over a range of major decisions and impose restraints on a CEO’s decision 
outcomes. Narcissistic CEOs tend to exaggerate their creation, intelligence, competence, and 
leadership ability (Farwell & Wohlwend-Lloyd, 1998; Paulhus, 1998; Judge et al., 2006) and 
as a result are unwilling to be controlled or restrained by the boards. Therefore, highly 
narcissistic CEOs will avoid candidates who might increase the level of board monitoring and 
control over them, while favoring new director candidates who might protect or increase their 
control.  
Furthermore, existing research has pointed out that narcissistic individuals tend to 
adjust their behaviors to have their positive self-concept continuously reinforced (Morf & 
Rhodewalt 2001). In order to reinforce such positive self-concepts, narcissists tend to 
dominate other people (Bradlee & Emmons, 1992; Morf & Rhodewalt 2001). Social 
psychology research has shown that narcissistic leaders are especially motivated to be 
dominant in interactions with other group members and tend to reduce the impact of other 
group members’ influence on teams’ decision outcomes (Nevicka et al., 2011). Campbell and 
Miller (2011) also pointed out that narcissistic individuals tend to be dominant in making 
visible and task-related decisions to draw attention to their leadership. Highly narcissistic 
CEOs who have a strong desire for dominance are, thus, more likely to sustain and increase 
their influence and control over the company by hiring and promoting director candidates who 
Chapter 4. The Effects of CEO Narcissism on Risk Taking and Director Selection: Evidence from an 
Online Experiment 
81 
might support their personal or political interests. The relative control by the CEO or board 
might also be changed by the selection of new directors (Westphal & Zajac, 1995), which 
would influence board actions and the CEO’s future strategic approach (Adams, Hermalin, & 
Weisbach, 2010; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1988). New high power directors increase a board’s 
power and dominance while weakening CEO’s power and dominance, so highly narcissistic 
CEOs who tend to be dominant will avoid hiring directors who might impair their dominance. 
Thus, narcissistic CEOs are less likely to hire high power directors. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): CEO narcissism is negatively associated with the power of new 
directors. 
4.2.3 Moderating Effect of Firm Performance 
Based on upper echelons theory, researchers argued that executives do not always have 
complete latitude of action; thus, managerial discretion affects the degree to which CEOs have 
influence over organizational outcomes (Crossland & Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick & 
Finkelstein, 1987). Li and Tang (2010) further pointed out that the effects of CEOs’ 
psychological characteristics on firm decisions could be influenced by both external and 
internal factors. Thus, if narcissism plays an important role in CEOs’ decision making, it is 
necessary to identify the potential factors that could influence its impact. Building on upper 
echelons theory, we explored the idea that firm performance might be an important moderator 
of the relationship between CEO narcissism and their firm decisions. 
Firm performance provides a signal about a company’s overall resource conditions and 
its capability in managing imminent business conditions (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011). With 
varying financial performance, a CEOs’ degree of discretion would change accordingly. Good 
performance reflects that an organization's form and fate rests within top managers’ control, 
and also provides more opportunities and available resources to the firm, allowing CEOs 
higher degrees of discretion (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). Furthermore, firm performance 
is often attributed to leaders (Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988; Meindl, Ehrlich, & Dukerich, 
1985). When firm performance is good, there is a strong propensity to credit CEOs with firm’s 
success (Meindl et al., 1985). When firm performance is poor, the company often attributes 
the poor financial performance to the CEOs as well (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997), which 
increases the likelihood that the board of directors would put more restrains on CEOs' 
decisions and activities. Thus, a CEO is likely to have more degrees of freedom when firm 
performance is positive. While narcissists tend to constantly seek admiration and 
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reinforcement of their inflated self-concepts (Campbell et al., 2004), the enhanced discretion 
would strengthen the effect of CEO narcissism on firm decisions.  
 Hypothesis 3 (H3): Firm performance strengthens the positive relationship between 
CEO narcissism and risk taking. 
 Hypothesis 4 (H4): Firm performance strengthens the negative relationship between 
CEO narcissism and the power of new directors. 
4.3 Methods 
4.3.1 Sample  
In order to test our hypotheses, we conducted an online experiment on Amazon Mechanical 
Turk (MTurk), which, as a source of valid experimental data, allows us a diverse set of 
participants (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2011). 
The participants on MTurk could decide whether to take part in an experiment based on the 
experiment topic, compensation level, and task length. Only the participants who actually 
complete the experiment are eligible for compensation. Our final sample consisted of 300 
participants (60% female; overall average age 30.64; 72% with Bachelor’s degree or higher; 
71% with work experience of six years or more).   
4.3.2 Procedure 
The experiment was divided into four parts, together taking about 25 minutes for each 
participant to complete. In the first part, we measured participants’ narcissism, some control 
variables and participants’ risk attitudes. In the second part, we used a cover story that put 
participants into the position of a CEO of one of the 500 largest public U.S. companies (Koch 
& Biemann, 2014). After a short presentation of their company and background, participants 
were asked to make decisions on new director selection and company acquisition plan. The 
latter was used to measure their risk propensity. In the third part, participants were asked to 
make decisions in two simulated years. We presented a short cover story about the company’s 
financial development, which was positive or negative. Participants were then asked to make 
decisions on new director selection and the company's market development plan on the basis 
of two simulated years’ of financial development. In the last part, participants answered 
questions regarding demographic information and the manipulation checks. 
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4.3.3 Measures 
Narcissism. We measured narcissism with Emmons’ (1984, 1987) Narcissistic Personality 
Inventory (NPI) (see Appendix A.1). The NPI consists of four factors with 37 items: 
leadership/authority (e.g., “I would prefer to be a leader” vs “It makes little difference to me 
whether I am a leader or not”), self-absorption/self-admiration(e.g., “I think I am a special 
person” vs “I am no better or no worse than most people”), superiority/arrogance (e.g., 
“People can learn a great deal from me” vs “There is a lot that I can learn from other people”) 
and exploitativeness/entitlement (e.g., “I find it easy to manipulate people” vs “I don't like it 
when I find myself manipulating people”). The participants were asked to choose the 
statement from each pair that best described themselves. Cronbach’s alpha for the 37-item 
scale was 0.91. We built the final narcissism measure by calculating the sum of the 
participant’s responses. Therefore, the NPI scores can range from 0 to 37, and the higher 
scores indicate higher levels of narcissism. 
Risk Taking. In the first part of the experiment, we measured self-assessed risk attitudes (risk 
taking 1) by asking participants to grade themselves towards risk in general and then within 
specific contexts. These were risks regarding financial matters, leisure and sports, career, 
health, and car driving (Dohmen et al., 2005). The participants indicated their willingness to 
take risks on an 11-point scale ranging from zero (not at all prepared to take risk) to 10 (very 
much prepared to take risk). We built the final risk-taking measure by calculating the simple 
mean of the participant’s responses. 
We then measured risk taking (risk taking 2) based on the commonly used procedure 
by Eckel and Grossman (2002). Specially, we let the participants choose from six circles that 
are shown in Figure 4.2 (Deck, Reyes, & Rosen, 2012). Each circle is divided in two parts and 
contains two possible earnings. Participants could hypothetically earn either a large or a small 
amount shown in the circle, each occurring with 50% probability. In this task, the probability 
is fixed with a varying payoff. The circle with more extreme earnings is indicative of higher 
risk taking. We chose these two measurements of risk taking in the individual decision-making 
setting because Dohmen et al. (2005) and Ding, Hartog, and Sun (2010) showed that these two 
measurements do not correlate very strongly even though both of them are commonly used in 
previous research. 
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Figure 4.2 Screen Image of the Risk Taking Task (Deck et al., 2012) 
 
To measure risk-taking behavior in a business setting, participants were informed that 
they are in the position of a CEO of one of the 500 largest public U.S. companies. We used an 
adaptation of Tversky and Kahneman’s (1981) Asian Disease Problem to measure risk-taking 
behavior (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006). Specifically, participants were informed that the 
company is discussing an acquisition plan. They were asked to make a choice between Plan A 
(do not make the acquisition) and Plan B (make the acquisition): “Plan A: We do not make the 
acquisition. We have an alternative investment where we could gain 240 million dollars for 
sure. Plan B: We make the acquisition. Our company has a 1/3 probability of gaining 720 
million, but has a 2/3 probability of gaining nothing.” We applied the six-point scale used by 
Anderson and Galinsky (2006) to measure participants’ preferences, ranging from very risk 
averse (very much prefer plan A) to highly risk seeking (very much prefer plan B).  
To measure risk-taking behavior in the third part of the experiment, we informed the 
participants that their companies are discussing a market development plan. They needed to 
make a choice between Plan A (do not invest in the oversea market) and Plan B (invest in the 
oversea market). “Plan A: We do not invest in the oversea market. We have an alternative 
investment where we could gain 320/260 million dollars for sure. Plan B: We invest in the 
oversea market. Our company has a 1/3 probability of gaining 960/780 million dollars, but has 
a 2/3 probability of gaining nothing.” We also applied the six-point scale to measure 
participants’ preferences.  
Director Power. We measured new directors’ power by applying two indicators of 
Finkelstein’s (1992) measurement of prestige power: the number of corporate board 
appointments held and the number of non-profit board appointments held. Finkelstein (1992) 
also argued that the general financial condition of the firms for which a manager is a board 
member also reflects their power. Here, we measured the general financial condition of the 
firm for which the candidate was board member by identifying whether the firms were in the 
Forbes 500 listing of the largest U.S. companies. We presented the information including 
name, age, gender, current public company boards, and current nonprofit boards of the two 
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candidates. For example, “The first candidate: Market T. Denham. Male. Age 55. Current 
Public Company Boards (two): Ford Motor Company; Air Lease Corporation. Ford Motor 
Company is in the Forbes 500 listing of the largest U.S. companies. Current Nonprofit Boards 
(three): American Museum of Natural History; Boy Scouts of America; Feeding America.” 
Participants were then asked to make a choice between the two candidates. 
Control Variables. Because individuals’ decision making might be affected by their 
demographic characteristics, we controlled the following demographic variables: gender, age, 
nationality, highest achieved education, and years of work experience. Judge et al. (2006) 
stated that it is important to consider whether narcissism adds to the prediction of their 
decision making over and above other personality traits. As such, we also controlled other 
personality measures that might influence a CEO’s decisions (see Appendix A.2). We 
controlled self-esteem with 10 items (Rosenberg, 1965), 12-item self-efficacy (Bosscher & 
Smit, 1998), which was originally developed by Sherer et al. (1982), and the Ten-Item 
Personality Inventory (TIPI) developed by Gosling, Rentfrow, and Swann (2003) to measure 
the Big-Five personality dimensions (McCrae & Costa, 1987): extraversion, agreeableness, 
conscientiousness, emotional stability, and openness to experience. We used 7-point-Likert 
scales ranging from 1 (“disagree strongly”) to 7 (“agree strongly”) for these scales. 
Self-esteem and self-efficacy were calculated by taking the simple mean of all items. For 
Big-Five personality dimensions, we took the simple mean of the two items for the five 
dimensions. We also asked participants for the degree to which they identified with their role 
as CEO on a 7-point scale. Lastly, as a manipulation check, we asked participants how they 
perceived the financial situation in the respective years on a scale from 1 (“poor”) to 7 
(“excellent”).  
4.3.4 Results 
Participants identified with their role as CEO with a mean of 5.53 on a 7-point scale and 
perceived the financial situation with a mean of 5.91 in positive years and 3.28 in negative 
years on a 7-point scale. This indicates that participants perceived our experimental treatment 
in the intended way. We computed variance inflation factors (VIFs) to assess multicollinearity 
problems. The results showed that all VIFs were below two, so multicollinearity was not a 
critical problem in our regression models. 
The descriptive statistics and correlations are presented in Table 4.1. As anticipated, in 
the individual decision-making setting, narcissism was positively associated with self-assessed 
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risk attitude (risk taking 1) (r = 0.56, p < .001) and hypothetical lottery questions (risk taking 
2) (r = 0.26, p < .001). Furthermore, in the simulated business setting where the participants 
were put into the position of a CEO, narcissism was positively associated with risk taking (r = 
0.26, p < .001). With both negative and positive firm performances in the experiment, 
narcissism was positively related to risk taking (r = 0.18, p < .01 and r = 0.28, p < .001, 
respectively).  
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Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (N=300) 
 
Variables Mean St.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Narcissism 14.7 8.54 (.91)         
2. RiskTaking1 6.43 2.35 .56***         
3. RiskTaking2 2.43 1.71 .26*** .19***        
4.RiskTaking_CEO 2.60 1.69 .26*** .26*** .31***       
5. RiskTaking _positive 2.86 1.76 .28*** .28*** .34*** .60***      
6. RiskTaking _negative  2.75 1.68 .18** .25*** .15** .40*** .29***     
7. Director Power_CEO 0.85 0.36 -.05 .00 -.03 -.03 .01 .00    
8. Director Power_ positive 0.70 0.46 .03 .09 -.02 -.11 -.03 -.06 .31***   
9. Director Power_ negative 0.81 0.40 -.06 -.06 .04 -.12* -.07 -.11 .05 -.10  
10. Self-esteem 5.26 1.17 .07 -.02 .11 -.04 .07 -.01 -.03 .04 .12*(.90)
11. Self-efficacy 4.97 1.13 .01 -.06 .05 -.07 .05 -.05 -.10 .04 .05 
12. Extraversion 3.86 1.55 .48*** .35*** .23*** .19*** .21*** .13* -.03 .03 -.01 
13. Agreeableness 5.12 1.25 -.19** -.12* .01 -.12* -.09 -.08 .01 .15** .09 
14. Conscientiousness 5.34 1.26 -.07 -.14* -.01 -.09 -.01 -.12* -.03 -.01 .06 
15. Emotional stability 4.93 1.46 .05 .02 .16** .03 .13 -.03 -.01 .06 .03 
16. Openness 5.12 1.23 .15** .02 .09 .00 .07 .04 -.15** -.05 .05 
17. Gender 0.60 0.49 .20*** .12* .11 .05 .12* .02 .04 .02 .03 
18. Age 30.64 10.67 -.24*** -.08 -.06 -.09 -.09 -.12* -.05 -.02 .00 
19. US dummy 0.55 0.50 -.42*** -.52*** -.12* -.15** -.12* -.09 -.02 -.03 .08 
20. Education 4.72 1.16 .39*** .29*** .12* .08 .09 .09 -.05 .04 -.01 
21. Work experience 5.24 1.33 -.23*** -.15** -.11 -.07 -.04 -.10 -.11 -.09 .01 
Variables 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
11. Self-efficacy .76*** (.90)          
12. Extraversion .31*** .30*** (.60)         
13. Agreeableness .55*** .49*** .07 (.34)        
14. Conscientiousness .56*** .60*** .18** .41*** (.49)       
15. Emotional stability .66*** .62*** .33*** .53*** .48*** (.65)  
16. Openness .59*** .56*** .30*** .33*** .40*** .39*** (.42)     
17. Gender .02 .05 .05 -.06 .02 .14* -.05     
18. Age .13* .08 -.05 .16** .11 .15** .06 .00
19. US dummy .13* .20*** -.13* .06 .13* .09 .07 -.15** .10   
20. Education .01 -.03 .29*** -.04 .02 .02 .09 .09 -.17** .38***  
21. Work experience .24*** .22*** .02 .21*** .19** .26*** .20** .00 .75*** .24*** -.18**
Note: Reliability estimates (Cronbach’s alpha) are shown in brackets; * p<.05;** p<.01;*** p<.001. 
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Table 4.2 provides the multiple regression analyses results of self-assessed risk 
attitude and hypothetical lottery questions on narcissism. Model 2 and Model 4 report results 
from the full model, including all control variables and risk taking. In Model 2 and Model 4, 
the standardized coefficient is beta = 0.34 (p < .001) for self-assessed risk attitude and beta = 
0.15 (p < .05) for the hypothetical lottery questions, which indicates that narcissism is 
positively associated with risk taking. Results in Table 4.3 further indicate that narcissism is 
positively associated with risk taking (β = 0.17, p < .05) (see Model 2). Thus, Hypothesis 1 is 
supported, i.e., narcissism is positively associated with risk taking. Hypothesis 2 suggested 
that CEO narcissism is negatively related to the power of new directors. This hypothesis was 
tested with a regression analysis of the power of new directors on narcissism. The results in 
Table 4.4 indicate that narcissism is not significantly associated with the power of new 
directors (β = -0.06). Thus, Hypothesis 2 is not supported. Hypothesis 3 posited that firm 
performance moderates the effect of CEO narcissism on risk taking. The coefficient of the 
interaction term in Model 2 in Table 4.5 is not significant (β = 0.12). However, we obtained a 
positive and significant coefficient for narcissism (β = 0.17, p < .05) when firm performance 
was positive (see Model 4 in Table 4.3). Results between narcissism and risk taking were not 
significant when firm performance was negative (β = 0.08) (see Model 6 in Table 4.3). These 
results indicate that firm performance might have some impact on the effect of narcissism on 
risk taking, partly supporting Hypothesis 3. Hypothesis 4 suggested that firm performance 
moderates the effect of narcissism on the power of new directors. The results in Table 4.5 
indicate that coefficient of the interaction term (Model 4) is not significant (β = 0.09). 
Therefore, Hypothesis 4 is not supported. 
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Table 4.2 The Effect of Narcissism on Risk Taking 
Variables Model 1 
Risk taking1 
Model 2 
Risk taking1 
Model 3 
Risk taking2 
Model 4 
Risk taking2 
Self-esteem .04 -.01 .11 .08 
Self-efficacy .03 .05 -.10 -.09 
Extraversion .29*** .16** .17* .11 
Agreeableness -.10 -.03 -.06 -.02 
Conscientiousness -.16** -.12* -.09 -.08 
Emotional stability .04 .04 .18* .18* 
Openness .01 -.03 .05 .03 
Gender .02 -.02 .07 .05 
Age .05 .09 .09 .11 
US dummy -.45*** -.36*** -.04 .00 
Education .03 -.01 .02 .00 
Work experience -.06 -.04 -.20* -.19* 
Narcissism  .34***  .15* 
F 15.23*** 17.94*** 2.98*** 3.09*** 
Adjusted R2 .36 .42 .07 .08 
Note: a Standardized coefficients are reported. 
        b All VIFs are below 2. 
     * p<.05;** p< .01;*** p< .001. 
 
Table 4.3 The Effect of CEO Narcissism on Risk Taking 
Variables Model 1 
Risk taking 
(As CEO) 
Model 2 
Risk taking 
(As CEO) 
Model 3 
Risk taking 
(Positive) 
Model 4 
Risk taking 
(Positive) 
Model 5 
Risk taking 
(Negative) 
Model 6 
Risk taking 
(Negative) 
Self-esteem .00 -.03 .05 .02 .07 .06 
Self-efficacy -.10 -.09 -.02 -.02 -.05 -.05 
Extraversion .18** .11 .14 .08 .11 .09 
Agreeableness -.12 -.08 -.19* -.15* -.06 -.04 
Conscientiousness -.08 -.06 -.06 -.05 -.14 -.13 
Emotional 
stability 
.14 .14 .19* .18* .01 .01 
Openness .03 .01 .04 .02 .07 .07 
Gender .01 -.01 .07 .05 .01 .00 
Age -.09 -.07 -.11 -.09 -.09 -.08 
US dummy -.12 -.08 -.10 -.05 -.04 -.02 
Education -.04 -.06 -.02 -.04 .01 .00 
Work experience .04 .05 .05 .06 -.01 .00 
Narcissism  .17*  .17*  .08 
F 2.32** 2.54** 2.74** 3.25*** 1.43 1.39 
Adjusted R2 .05 .06 .07 .09 .02 .02 
Note: a Standardized coefficients are reported. 
        b All VIFs are below 2. 
     * p< .05;** p< .01;*** p< .001. 
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Table 4.4 The Effect of CEO Narcissism on the Power of New Directors 
Variables Model 1 
 (As CEO) 
Model 2 
 (As CEO) 
Model 3 
 (Positive) 
Model 4 
 (Positive) 
Model 5 
 (Negative) 
Model 6 
(Negative) 
Self-esteem .13 .14 .00 -.01 .21* .22* 
Self-efficacy -.17 -.17 .06 .06 -.11 -.11 
Extraversion .02 .05 .04 .02 -.01 .01 
Agreeableness .06 .05  .21** .22** .09 .07 
Conscientiousness .03 .03 -.07 -.07 .01 .00 
Emotional 
stability 
.04 .04 .00 .00 -.10 -.10 
Openness -.16* -.15* -.11 -.11 -.01 .00 
Gender .04 .05 .03 .02 .06 .07 
Age .04 .03 .11 .12 -.02 -.02 
US dummy .00 -.01 .02 .04 .10 .08 
Education -.07 -.07 .04 .04 .02 .03 
Work experience -.15 -.15 -.20* -.19* -.01 -.02 
Narcissism  -.06  .05  -.06 
F 1.40 1.35 1.53 1.45 .87 .62 
Adjusted R2 .02 .02 .02 .02 -.01 -.02 
Note: a Standardized coefficients are reported. 
        b All VIFs are below 2. 
     * p< .05;** p< .01;*** p< .001. 
 
Table 4.5 The Moderator Effects of Financial Performance 
Variables Model 1 
    Risk taking 
Model 2 
Risk taking  
Model 3 
Director power 
Model 4 
Director power 
Self-esteem .04 .04 .10 .10 
Self-efficacy -.03 -.03 -.02 -.02 
Extraversion .08 .08 .02 .02 
Agreeableness -.10 -.10 .15* .15* 
Conscientiousness -.09 -.09 -.04 -.04 
Emotional stability .10 .10 -.05 -.05 
Openness .04 .04 -.06 -.06 
Gender .02 .02 .04 .04 
 Age -.09 -.09 .05 .05 
US dummy -.03 -.03 .06 .06 
Education -.02 -.02 .03 .03 
Work experience .03 .03 -.11 -.11 
Narcissism .12* .07 .00 -.04 
Financial performance .03 -.06 -.13* -.20* 
Narcissism*performance  .12  .09 
F 3.49*** 3.39*** 2.06* 2.00* 
Adjusted R2 .06 .06 .02 .02 
Note: a Standardized coefficients are reported. 
        b All VIFs are below 2. 
     * p< .05;** p< .01;*** p< .001. 
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4.4 Discussion and Conclusion 
This study examined the role of narcissism in CEO decision-making, focusing on risk-taking 
behavior, director selection, and company financial performance. We tested the hypothesized 
relationship in an online experiment and found support for some of our hypotheses in the 
experiment. Specifically, our results suggest that narcissism is positively associated with risk 
taking. Results also provide some support that firm performance moderates the effect of CEO 
narcissism on risk taking. 
4.4.1 The Relationship between CEO Narcissism and Risk Taking 
Our findings make several contributions to the management literature. Existing research on 
individual decision making has shown that narcissism is positively related to risk taking (e.g., 
Emmons, 1981; Lakey et al., 2008). We extended this line of research and designed an 
experimental setting where we appointed each participant as a CEO to analyze the role of 
narcissism in business settings. The present research received consistent results about the 
positive relationship between narcissism and risk taking, which emphasized the level of 
importance that top executives’ psychological characteristics have on firm-level decisions and 
outcomes. Narcissistic individuals tend to make risky decisions arguably because of their 
inflated self-conceptions. Such inflated self-conceptions lead narcissistic CEOs to 
overestimate their overall problem solving capabilities, while underestimating the resource 
requirements of strategic initiatives and the uncertainties in the operating process. 
Furthermore, narcissistic CEOs’ strong desire for applause, affirmation, and power (Morf & 
Rhodewalt, 2001) makes them strive for bold, daring actions to win applause and draw 
attention. 
4.4.2 The Relationship between CEO Narcissism and the Power of New Directors  
This study also makes a contribution to governance research. The interrelationship between 
CEO and the board has long been an important issue in corporate governance research 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Westphal & Zajac, 1995). However, previous perspectives on director 
selection have mostly focused on directors’ demographic characteristics, social and human 
capital, and their similarity to the focal CEO’s narcissistic tendency as well as their prior 
experience with other similarly narcissistic CEOs (Westphal & Zajac, 1995; Westphal & Stern 
2006; Zhu & Chen, 2014b). Furthermore, although many studies have focused on CEOs’ role 
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in the director selection process, little research has examined whether narcissism influences 
that process, specifically whether a narcissistic CEO would hire a high power director. Since 
highly narcissistic CEOs have a strong desire for control and power (Bradlee & Emmons, 
1992; Morf & Rhodewalt 2001), they may not hire a high power director who might increase 
the power of boards and impose restraints on their strategic decisions. Although we found no 
support for this relationship in the data, consideration on the role of CEO narcissism in the 
director selection process provides opportunities for future research. 
4.4.3 The Effect of Firm Performance 
This study also has some implications for strategic leadership research on managerial 
discretion by considering whether firm performance plays a role in the effect of CEO 
narcissism on firm decisions. Existing research suggested that managerial discretion is an 
important factor that predicts the degree to which decision makers’ demographic 
characteristics, personalities, and experiences are reflected in their corporate decisions (e.g., 
Crossland & Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987; Li & Tang, 2010). However, 
there is not much research so far to identify the managerial discretion that could influence the 
extent to which a CEO’s narcissistic tendency matters to organizational outcomes. 
Furthermore, there is an increasing stream of research aimed at understanding the 
effectiveness of narcissistic CEOs (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007, 2011; Resick et al., 2009; 
Wales et al., 2013), but with inconclusive results thus far. Resick et al. (2009), for example, 
found that narcissism has no relationship to team performance, while Chatterjee and Hambrick 
(2007) pointed out CEO narcissism is positively associated with firm performance variance. 
However, little research has examined whether a firm’s financial performance influences 
narcissistic CEOs’ decision making strategy. Firm performance, as an organization-level 
determinant of managerial discretion, reflects a CEO’s leadership ability, and a company’s 
overall capability should moderate a narcissistic CEO’s major corporate decisions. Despite the 
fact that we found evidence that alternating firm performance does not significantly affect a 
narcissistic CEO’s firm decisions, identifying firm performance as the potential 
organization-level determinant of managerial discretion in narcissistic CEO’s decision making 
processes makes a path for future studies. 
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4.4.4 Practical Implications 
Our results suggest that CEO narcissism affects company decision making. A highly 
narcissistic CEO usually makes strategy decisions that are not in the best interests of their 
company mainly because the CEO tends to overestimate their abilities, brilliance, and 
competence and tends to constantly engage in activities that reinforce their inflated 
self-concept. It is thus important to strengthen a company’s monitoring mechanism to make 
highly narcissistic CEOs’ decisions more effective. The board of directors plays an important 
role in a firm’s strategic decisions (Westphal & Zajac, 2013). A board of directors could also 
prevent managers from engaging in self-interested behaviors (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Thus, 
it is might be an ideal governance arrangement to couple narcissistic CEOs with powerful 
boards. Furthermore, the positive effect of narcissism on risk taking also provides some 
recommendations on CEO selection. Different companies in different situations may have 
different requirements for risk-taking behaviors (Jordan, Sivanathan, & Galinsky, 2011). For 
example, in novel or chaotic situations, a company might encourage risk taking, thus driving 
the company to assess narcissistic tendencies in their routine screening when they hire a CEO. 
Additionally, NPI, as the most important instrument in identifying narcissistic qualities, might 
play an important role in identifying narcissistic CEOs.  
4.4.5 Limitations and Further Research 
Like any study, our study has several limitations. The first limitation is that we gathered the 
data from an online experiment on MTurk. We designed the experiment on MTurk, and thus 
our data might differ from an experiment conducted with actual CEOs. However, CEOs in 
large companies are mostly unwilling to take part in this kind of study and we therefore argue 
that our setting offers an adequate setting to test our research framework. Previous research 
showed that participants with diverse backgrounds on MTurk provide high quality and reliable 
data (Buhrmester, et al., 2011; Paolacci, et al., 2011). We also have pointed out that the 
participants sufficiently identified with their role as a CEO and adequately perceived the 
financial situations presented in the study. Furthermore, other researchers have successfully 
used non-CEO samples to study CEO narcissism. For example, Peterson et al. (2012) first 
validated narcissism scales with a sample of MBA students and then used the scale in studies 
with CEOs. Boone et al. (1998) designed an experimental setting to explore the relationship 
between the features of TMTs and organizational performance. Thus, we would not expect 
that our conclusions would show a significant difference with a sample of actual CEOs. 
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However, collecting such data from top executives in field studies is still necessary to refine 
our findings. Since it is difficult to collect data from top executives, future CEO-level research 
could also combine online experiments with unobtrusive measures that use data from publicly 
available sources.  
Second, results from our online experiment provided consistent support for some, but 
not all, of our hypotheses. The effect of CEO narcissism on the power of new directors was 
not supported in the data. Future research might consider narcissistic CEOs’ other decisions on 
director selection, such as whether highly narcissistic CEOs tend to hire highly narcissistic 
directors, to help us further understand the CEO-board relationships. Furthermore, we did not 
find support for the moderating role of firm performance on narcissistic CEOs’ 
decision-making processes. Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) identified environmental, 
organizational, and individual determinants of managerial discretion. At the environmental 
level, future research could examine whether market munificence, market complexity, and 
market uncertainty affect narcissistic CEOs’ managerial discretion, and the relationship 
between CEO narcissism and firm risk taking, the power of new directors, and other firm 
decisions. At the individual level of managerial discretion, future research could consider 
whether CEO power influences narcissistic CEOs’ decisions on risk taking and director 
selection. 
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CHAPTER 5 
5  Conclusion 
Although the three essays in this dissertation address different research issues, they 
complement each other and generally focus on the role of CEO narcissism in company 
management. Chapter 2 examines the relationship between a CEO’s social status, CEO 
narcissism, and firm performance. This chapter aims to disentangle the causal relationships 
by means of multiple common factors, crossed-lagged regression models, and DID models. 
The findings from Chapter 2 indicate a reciprocal influence between a CEO’s social status 
and CEO narcissism. That is, CEOs with higher social status will be more narcissistic than 
CEOs with a relatively lower social status, and CEOs with higher narcissistic tendency tend 
to have a higher social status. Chapter 3 draws attention to the CEO-board relationship and 
investigates the interrelations between board power and CEO narcissism, and their effect on a 
firm’s strategic change and firm performance. Based on a five-wave longitudinal design, our 
results suggest that a powerful board tends not to hire narcissistic CEOs. CEO narcissism is, 
in turn, negatively associated with board power following the CEO’s appointment. 
Furthermore, a CEO’s narcissism fosters strategic change. We further found some support 
that CEO narcissism moderates the effect of strategic change on firm performance. These 
findings help increase our understanding of the role boards play in the CEO selection process, 
how narcissistic CEOs manage their relations with the board, and how CEOs and boards 
influence company strategy. Focusing on narcissistic CEOs’ decision making processes, 
Chapter 4 examines the relevance of CEO narcissism for firm risk taking and director 
selection, and further develops the moderating role of firm performance in these 
relationships. Drawing upon upper echelons theory and personality theories, we developed 
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and tested hypotheses in an online experiment with 300 participants. Our results suggest that 
narcissism is positively associated with risk taking both in an individual decision making 
setting and a simulated business setting. We further found in our simulation that narcissistic 
CEOs’ decisions on risk taking and director selection were not significantly influenced by the 
company’s financial development. All in all, the three chapters try to explore three research 
questions: the role of narcissism in influencing CEOs’ decisions and behaviors, the 
effectiveness of narcissistic CEOs, and whether and how individual and organizational 
factors influence a CEO’s narcissistic tendency or their decision making processes. The three 
essays complement each other and provide valuable insights for theoretical development and 
managerial practices. 
5.1 Theoretical Implications 
This dissertation contributes to emerging research that focuses on CEO personality, 
particularly CEO narcissism, in many ways. The concept of CEO narcissism has received 
growing attention in upper echelons literature since Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) 
introduced this concept in the management context. Existing research that examines 
narcissism at the CEO level has explored different research questions and mainly focuses on 
the effectiveness of narcissistic CEOs (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; 2011), narcissistic 
CEOs’ strategic decisions (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; Gerstner et al., 2013), the 
CEO-board relationship (Zhu & Chen, 2014a, b), the CEO-Top Management Team (TMT) 
relationship (Reina et al., 2014), and so on. In line with existing research that aims to uncover 
the effectiveness of narcissistic CEOs, especially the relationship between CEO narcissism 
and firm performance, Chapter 2 examines whether there is a reciprocal relation between 
CEO narcissism and firm performance. Chapter 3 explores the moderated mediation effect of 
CEO narcissism on firm performance, and Chapter 4 attempts to discover whether firm 
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performance in turn influences a narcissistic CEO’s decision making process. Our results 
somehow support the proposition that CEO narcissism moderates the effect of strategic 
changes on firm performance. Furthermore, our findings also suggest that a firm’s financial 
performance could not influence a CEO’s narcissistic tendency or decisions. As 
aforementioned, existing research has painted a complicated picture of the relationship 
between CEO narcissism and firm performance, and our work complements this stream of 
research, discovering that the link between CEO narcissism and firm performance is not as 
simple as direct positive or negative effects. 
Furthermore, this dissertation also enriches the understanding of the link between 
CEO narcissism and company strategic decisions. Existing research has shown that highly 
narcissistic CEOs tend to make bold and risky decisions (e.g., Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007, 
2011). In line with this stream of research, Chapter 3 applies the unobtrusive indicators of 
narcissism, first linking CEO narcissism to strategic change, and then examining the 
moderating role of board power in that relationship. Chapter 4 employs the NPI to explore the 
relationship between narcissism and risk taking in both individual decision making settings 
and business settings. The findings obtained from Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 show that CEO 
narcissism is positively associated with strategic change and risk taking, and the results also 
suggest narcissistic CEOs’ decision making could not be significantly influenced by the 
moderators, board power, and firm performance. These findings are consistent with previous 
viewpoints that narcissists favor bold decisions and behaviors, and that narcissistic leaders 
tend to be dominant and, thus, are more likely to ignore objective performance when making 
company strategy decisions (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011). 
Additionally, this dissertation extends the existing research on CEO-board 
relationships. Specifically, the longitudinal study in Chapter 3 explores the interrelation 
between board power and CEO narcissism. Chapter 4 conducts an online experiment on 
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MTurk to examine the effect of CEO narcissism on the power of new directors. Previous 
studies stated that boards play an important role in selecting and dismissing top-management 
team members (Ruigrok, Peck, & Keller, 2006), and there are some researchers who pointed 
out that CEOs in turn play an important role in the director selection process (Lorsch & 
MacIver, 1989). However, previous perspectives on CEO selection or director selection have 
mostly focused on the demographic characteristics (Westphal & Zajac, 1995; Westphal & 
Stern, 2006; Zhu & Chen, 2014b). Zhu and Chen (2014b) suggested CEO narcissism is 
important in understanding CEO-board relationships; thus, it is necessary to integrate 
personality theories with studies on CEO selection or direction selection. Chapter 3 implicitly 
indicates that board power is negatively associated with the selection of a narcissistic CEO, 
which enriches the understanding of the CEO selection process. Although Chapter 4 finds no 
support for the relationship between CEO narcissism and the power of new directors, 
considering the role of CEO narcissism in the director selection process illustrates a direction 
for future research. In order to explain how narcissistic CEOs deal with their relationship 
with the board of directors, we not only addressed the link between CEO narcissism and 
director selection, but also explored how narcissistic CEOs influence board power after their 
appointment. Existing studies have shown that boards of directors tend to exert more and 
more influence on strategic decision making (see review by Westphal & Zajac, 2013). A 
narcissistic CEO who has a strong desire for power and control is more likely to have a 
conflict with the board of directors, especially a powerful board. Uncovering that a new, 
narcissistic CEO has a negative impact on board power sheds new light on CEO-board 
relations. 
Moreover, the causal relations between a CEO’s social status and CEO narcissism, 
which are found in Chapter 2, shed light on the development of personality traits over time. 
Existing research has pointed out that personality traits would continue to develop throughout 
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adult life (e.g., Wood et al., 2013). Our conclusion is consistent with this evidence that social 
roles (e.g., careers, family, and community) are the driving mechanisms of personality 
development. Furthermore, we also find that personality traits can, in turn, influence 
individuals’ social activities. The findings from Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 suggest board power 
and firm performance could not significantly affect a narcissistic CEO’s decisions and 
behaviors. Yet, the dynamic relationship between CEO narcissism and a CEO’s social status 
as uncovered in Chapter 2 provides opportunities to understand how CEOs’ personalities 
could influence and be influenced by their social activities.  
5.2 Practical Implications 
This dissertation also has some important and useful implications for practitioners. Our 
dissertation implies that a highly narcissistic CEO might bring a negative influence to the 
company in the long term. Chapter 3, for instance, indicates that CEO narcissism is 
negatively associated with board power and positively associated with strategic change 
following their appointment. Chapter 4 suggests that CEO narcissism is positively associated 
with risk taking. Thus, highly narcissistic CEOs have the potential to dampen firm 
effectiveness (Engelen et al., 2013). Furthermore, narcissism is usually considered to be a 
dark personality characteristic in the study of CEO leadership (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; 
Judge et al., 2006; Lubit, 2002; Maccoby, 2003); however, it appears that the qualities of 
narcissistic individuals often help them to be promoted to the CEO position (Rosenthal & 
Pittinsky, 2006), which represents a potential concern for companies during their CEO 
recruitment and selection process. Moreover, existing research also showed that the owners 
and managers might be seduced to hire a highly narcissistic leader because narcissists tend to 
perform better in the personnel selection interview context (Brunell et al., 2008; Paulhus et 
al., 2010). Therefore, CEO candidates’ narcissistic tendencies should be carefully assessed. 
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The most important instruments, such as the NPI, might play an important role in identifying 
narcissistic successors. Furthermore, some research has also pointed out that narcissism will 
bring a positive influence in novel or chaotic situations (e.g., Campbell et al., 2011). Thus, a 
company should appoint an appropriate CEO based on their own requirements. For example, 
companies focusing on long-term performance should avoid higher levels of narcissism 
during their CEO selection process. A company emphasizing rapid leader emergence or 
public performance should consider selecting higher levels of narcissism during their CEO 
selection process (Campbell et al., 2011). 
In addition, the dissertation also provides some suggestions for the CEO-board 
relationship. Chapter 3 shows that board power is negatively associated with the selection of 
a narcissistic CEO, which indicates that a powerful board could be more effective in 
monitoring and advising company management. Thus, it is important to have a powerful 
board in corporate governance, especially when the company has a highly narcissistic CEO. 
Furthermore, the findings obtained in Chapter 2 show that a CEO’s social status is positively 
associated with CEO narcissism, which means a CEO’s narcissistic tendency would continue 
to develop because of their social activities. Since a CEO’s personality development will 
influence his/her objectives and behaviors in corporate governance, it is important for the 
board of directors to understand the development of CEO narcissism. Thus, in addition to 
assessing a successor’s narcissistic tendency before he/she is appointed, a comprehensive 
performance evaluation system should be built to prevent a narcissistic CEO’s continued 
advancement if a narcissistic successor is already recruited into the company. All in all, the 
CEO-board relationship is complicated and should be carefully managed. To develop an 
effective working relationship between a CEO and board of directors, the first suggestion is 
to couple narcissistic CEOs with powerful boards. Another suggestion is for the board of 
directors to understand the development of CEO leadership and power, especially the 
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evolution of the CEO’s personality, which has an important influence in their objectives and 
behaviors. 
5.3 Limitations and Future Research 
Although this dissertation represents an important step in examining the important roles of 
executive characteristics in corporate governance, it still has several limitations that future 
research should address. The first limitation is that the lack of examination of the CEO-TMT 
interplay. Hambrick (1987) pointed out that strategic leadership should include the roles of 
CEOs, TMTs, and boards of directors. Chapter 2 aims to disentangle the causal relationship 
between the CEO’s social status and CEO narcissism, which centers on individual executive 
traits. Chapter 3 emphasizes the interrelations between board power and CEO narcissism and 
their effect on a firm’s strategic change. Chapter 4 focuses on narcissistic CEOs’ decisions 
when taking risks and during director selection. Although Chapters 3 and 4 examine 
intersections among groups of strategic leaders, none of them capture the role of TMTs, who 
interact most closely with CEOs and boards. Research on top management teams have 
recognized that TMT characteristics play an important role in firms’ strategic choices (see 
Carpenter, Geletkanycz, & Sanders, 2004 for a comprehensive review). CEOs usually shape 
the perceptions and reactions of lower level managers through collective perceptions, 
decisions, and actions of the TMTs (Carmeli & Schaubroek, 2006). As aforementioned, 
narcissism is one of the most important and controversial personality dimensions of CEOs. 
Therefore, it is necessary to examine the interface between a narcissistic CEO and his/her 
executive peers. Future research could explore how CEO narcissism influences TMT 
turnover. Narcissistic CEOs tend to be self-interested with hostility toward criticism, and are 
unlikely to have an equitable exchange with other TMT members (Lubit, 2002; Resicket al., 
2009). Thus, a highly narcissistic CEO does not generally get along with his/her executive 
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peers, which might lead to the dismissal and voluntary departure of other TMT members. 
Also interesting would be to explore deep-level TMT compositions, such as personality traits, 
through which CEO personality traits or leadership behaviors can exert effects on strategic 
choices and performance outcomes. For example, further exploration could include whether 
narcissistic CEOs will select top management team members who have a similar narcissistic 
tendency and whether CEO narcissism moderates the relationships between TMT personality 
composition and organizational effectiveness.  
Another limitation of this dissertation is that it mainly focuses on CEO narcissism and 
does not examine the influence of other CEO personalities in corporate governance. Although 
Chapter 2 includes the effects of other individual executive traits, such as social status, on 
CEO narcissism and firm outcome, both Chapters 3 and 4 only focus on how narcissistic 
CEOs manage companies differently. Even though narcissism is a fundamental personality 
trait of CEOs and has been distinguished from other personality dimensions in both concept 
and empirical study (Campbell & Miller, 2011; Paulhus & Williams, 2002), it is not the only 
personality dimension that could influence a CEO’s decisions and behaviors. Future studies 
can thus consider both narcissism and other personality dimensions, which will help to more 
fully understand a CEO’s role in corporate governance. Narcissism is usually regarded as a 
dark-side personality characteristic in CEO leadership studies (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; 
Judge et al., 2006; Lubit, 2002; Maccoby, 2003). Adopting bright-side personality 
characteristics, such as core self-evaluations (CSE), to better understand CEOs’ decision 
making processes and their relationships with boards of directors would be an interesting 
addition to the study. Core self-evaluations represent a personality trait that encompasses an 
individual's conclusions or bottom-line evaluations about their own abilities and control 
(Judge, Locke, & Durham, 1997). High-CSE leaders are more likely to be concerned with the 
talents and needs of individual employees and promote the fair exchange of rewards for 
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performance (Resick et al., 2009). Both narcissism and CSE could influence CEOs’ strategic 
decisions and their relationships with other group members, but high-CSE leaders tend to 
manage firms very differently from high-narcissistic leaders. Therefore, a future study could 
examine how narcissism and CSE influence a CEOs’ decisions and behaviors differently to 
help us better understand the relative influence of narcissism in corporate governance. 
A third limitation lies in each essay’s U.S. sample. Chapters 2 and 3 use U.S. 
companies listed on the S&P Composite 1500. Chapter 4 conducts an online experiment, with 
the final sample consisting of 300 participants, where 55% are American. Existing research 
has pointed out that executives’ status and actions are different in different parts of the world 
(Crossland & Hambrick, 2007, 2011). Crossland and Hambrick (2007), for example, found 
that CEOs had a larger impact on firm performance in U.S. than CEOs in Germany and Japan 
due to the differences in cultural values, firm ownership profiles, and governance. Therefore, 
further investigation into what extent national characteristics, particularly the level of 
discretion, impacts the study’s findings would also be an interesting component. China, for 
example, has long been considered to focus on collectivism rather than individualism, and 
has its own distinct social and economic systems (Redding, 1993). The Chinese context 
usually grants less managerial discretion because its particular context offers an opportunity 
to discover additional discretion-limiting factors: state ownership and CEO political 
appointment (Li & Tang, 2011). Thus, the Chinese context is quite different from the U.S., 
whose individualism and tolerance for uncertainty grants a high level of discretion (Crossland 
& Hambrick, 2011; Hofstede, 2001). Due to different levels of managerial discretion, 
executives in the U.S. and China will act quite differently when it comes to corporate 
governance. Furthermore, existing research has pointed out people’s perceptions, preferences, 
and behaviors differ systematically between nations (Hall & Soskice, 2001). Therefore, a 
CEO’s narcissistic tendency might differ across different countries. Future study could 
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explore whether CEOs’ narcissistic tendencies in China are different from those in the U.S., 
whether narcissistic CEOs matter more in the U.S., and whether there is a cross-national 
difference in CEO-board relationships. 
In sum, in this dissertation, three essays address different issues regarding the 
important role of CEO narcissism in company management. Our findings offer progress 
towards understanding how CEO narcissism influences organizational behaviors, how CEO 
narcissism influences the CEO-board relationship, and how CEO narcissism influences and 
can be influenced by firm performance and social roles. These findings are empirically 
validated by means of multisource data and different statistical methods to contribute to 
upper echelons and narcissism literature. 
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Appendix A 
Appendix to Chapter 4 
A.1  Measurement Items of Narcissism 
Please read each pair of statements and then choose the one that is closer to your own 
feelings about yourself (either "A" or "B"). 
1. A. I have a natural talent for influencing people. 
B. I am not good at influencing people. 
2. A. Superiority is something that you acquire with experience. 
B. Superiority is something you are born with. 
3. A. I would do almost anything on a dare. 
B. I tend to be a fairly cautious person. 
4. A. When people compliment me I sometimes get embarrassed. 
B. I know that I am good because everybody keeps telling me so. 
5. A. I would be willing to describe myself as a strong personality. 
B. I would be reluctant to describe myself as a strong personality. 
6. A. There is a lot that I can learn from other people. 
B. People can learn a great deal from me. 
7. A. I prefer to blend in with the crowd. 
B. I like to be the center of attention. 
8. A. Beauty is in the eye of the beholder. 
B. I have good taste when it comes to beauty. 
9. A. I am no better or no worse than most people. 
B. I think I am a special person. 
10. A. I am not sure if I would make a good leader. 
B. I see myself as a good leader.  
11. A. I am assertive. 
B. I wish I were more assertive. 
12. A. I like having authority over other people. 
B. I don't mind following orders. 
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13. A. I find it easy to manipulate people.  
B. I don't like it when I find myself manipulating people. 
14. A. I insist upon getting the respect that is due me. 
B. I usually get the respect that I deserve. 
15. A. I don't particularly like to show off my body. 
B. I like to display my body. 
16. A. I can read people like a book. 
B. People are sometimes hard to understand. 
17. A. I usually dominate any conversation. 
B. At times I am capable of dominating a conversation. 
18. A. I am envious of other people’s good fortune. 
B. I enjoy seeing other people have good fortune. 
19. A. My body is nothing special. 
B. I like to look at my body.  
20. A. I try not to be a show off. 
B. I am apt to show off if I get the chance. 
21. A. I always know what I am doing. 
B. Sometimes I am not sure of what I am doing. 
22. A. I am much like everybody else. 
B. I am an extraordinary person. 
23. A. Sometimes I tell good stories. 
B. Everybody likes to hear my stories.  
24. A. I expect a great deal from other people. 
B. I like to do things for other people. 
25. A. I will never be satisfied until I get all that I deserve. 
B. I take my satisfactions as they come. 
26. A. Compliments embarrass me. 
B. I like to be complimented. 
27. A. I have a strong will to power. 
B. Power for its own sake doesn't interest me. 
28. A. I get upset when people don't notice how I look when I go out in public. 
B. I don't mind blending into the crowd when I go out in public. 
29. A. I like to look at myself in the mirror. 
B. I am not particularly interested in looking at myself in the mirror. 
30. A. I really like to be the center of attention. 
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B. It makes me uncomfortable to be the center of attention. 
31. A. I am more capable than other people. 
B. There is a lot that I can learn from other people. 
32. A. Being an authority doesn't mean that much to me. 
B. People always seem to recognize my authority. 
33. A. I would prefer to be a leader. 
B. It makes little difference to me whether I am a leader or not. 
34. A. I am going to be a great person. 
B. I hope I am going to be successful. 
35. A. People sometimes believe what I tell them. 
B. I can make anybody believe anything I want them to. 
36. A. I am a born leader. 
B. Leadership is a quality that takes a long time to develop. 
37. A. I can usually talk my way out of anything. 
B. I try to accept the consequences of my behavior. 
 
A.2  Measurement Items of Other Personalities 
Please read the following statements which are dealing with your general feelings about 
yourself and indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each statement. 
7-point likert scale: 1=disagree strongly, 2=disagree moderately, 3=disagree a little, 
4=neither agree nor disagree, 5=agree a little, 6=agree moderately, 7=agree strongly 
1. I feel that I'm a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others. 
2. I feel that I have a number of good qualities. 
3. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure. 
4. I am able to do things as well as most other people. 
5. I feel I do not have much to be proud of. 
6. I take a positive attitude toward myself. 
7. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself. 
8. I wish I could have more respect for myself. 
9. I certainly feel useless at times. 
10. At times I think I am no good at all. 
11. I see myself as extraverted, enthusiastic.  
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12. I see myself as critical, quarrelsome.  
13. I see myself as dependable, self-disciplined.  
14. I see myself as anxious, easily upset.  
15. I see myself as open to new experiences, complex.  
16. I see myself as reserved, quiet.   
17. I see myself as sympathetic, warm.  
18. I see myself as disorganized, careless.  
19. I see myself as calm, emotionally stable.  
20. I see myself as conventional, uncreative.  
21. If something looks too complicated, I will not even bother to try it.  
22. I avoid trying to learn new things when they look to difficult.  
23. When trying something new, I soon give up if I am not initially successful.  
24. When I make plans, I am certain I can make them work.  
25. If I can't do a job the first time, I keep trying until I can.  
26. When I have something unpleasant to do, I stick to it until I finish it.  
27. When I decide to do something, I go right to work on it. 
28. Failure just makes me try harder.  
29. When I set important goals for myself, I rarely achieve them.  
30. I do not seem to be capable of dealing with most problems that come up in my life.  
31. When unexpected problems occur, I don't handle them very well.  
32. I feel insecure about my ability to do things. 
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